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Quantum key distribution (QKD), a novel cryptographic technique for secure distribution
of secret keys between two parties, is the first successful quantum technology to emerge
from quantum information science. The security of QKD is guaranteed by fundamental
properties of quantum mechanical systems, unlike public-key cryptography whose security
depends on difficult to solve mathematical problems such as factoring. Current terrestrial
quantum links are limited to about 250 km. However, QKD could soon be deployed on a
global scale over free-space links to an orbiting satellite used as a trusted node.
Envisioning a photonic uplink to a quantum receiver positioned on a low Earth orbit
satellite, the Canadian Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) is a collab-
orative project involving Canadian universities, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and
industry partners. This thesis presents some of the research conducted towards feasibility
studies of the QEYSSat mission.
One of the main goals of this research is to develop technologies for data acquisition
and processing required for a satellite-based QKD system. A working testbed system helps
to establish firmly grounded estimates of the overall complexity, the computing resources
necessary, and the bandwidth requirements of the classical communication channel. It
can also serve as a good foundation for the design and development of a future payload
computer onboard QEYSSat.
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a QKD post-processing system
which aims to minimize the computing requirements at one side of the link, unlike most
traditional implementations which assume symmetric computing resources at each end.
The post-processing software features precise coincidence analysis, error correction based
on low-density parity-check codes, privacy amplification employing Toeplitz hash functions,
and a procedure for automated polarization alignment.
The system’s hardware and software components integrate fully with a quantum optical
apparatus used to demonstrate the feasibility of QKD with a satellite uplink. Detailed
computing resource requirements and QKD results from the operation of the entire system
at high-loss regimes are presented here.
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This thesis is organized into five main chapters. The current chapter provides background
information on quantum key distribution (QKD) focusing on theoretical aspects of the
protocols as well as some practical aspects of satellite-based QKD. Chapter 2 describes
the experimental apparatus employed to model QKD with a satellite uplink. Chapter 3
details the design and implementation of a QKD post-processing system which aims to
minimize the computing requirements at the satellite side of the link. Chapter 4 provides
estimates of the computing resources required onboard the satellite as well as the classical
communication requirements. Finally, in chapter 5, a detailed performance analysis of the
entire QKD testbed system is presented.
1.1 Secure Communication
Secure communication is paramount to modern society. The rapid growth of electronic
transactions and interactions has come with rising concerns about security and privacy.
All kinds of information, from personal data to trade secrets, is regularly transmitted
over public communication channels, and yet, it needs to be protected from unauthorized
use. Secure communication is by no means new to the modern age, however, lately, its
importance has greatly increased due to the sheer amount of sensitive data exchanged on
a daily basis.
For centuries, many different cryptographic techniques have been employed (with vari-
able success) to ensure confidentiality between communicating parties. Today, we rely
heavily on public-key cryptosystems and protocols such as RSA, TLS, AES, to name a
few. Although very practical and suitable for high traffic rates, most of those protocols
do not actually guarantee provable security. Instead, they are deemed secure, because to
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break them an adversary needs to solve difficult mathematical problems such as factoring
of large integers. The measure of security in those schemes is the amount of computa-
tional power available to the adversary and the time necessary to solve the underlying
problems [1]. Thus, cryptographic standards need to be regularly updated as computing
technology moves forward.
There is one classical encryption scheme which is provably secure. Invented in 1882 by
Frank Miller, re-discovered and patented in 1917 by Gilbert Vernam, and proven optimal
in 1949 by Shannon [2], the Vernam cipher is a symmetric-key scheme in which both
communicating parties share a random secret key (or pad). To encrypt messages, the key
bits are simply XOR-ed1 with the message bits. Security is only guaranteed if the secret
key is used once, and hence the scheme is also known as the one-time pad. Thus, the size
of the shared key has to be greater than or equal to the length of the message—a major
limitation which has prevented the widespread use of one-time pad encryption. In other
words, for this scheme to be employed successfully, large amounts of key must be securely
distributed among communicating parties [1]. Classically, there is no reliable way to do so
other than physically transporting the key in a safe way (e.g. via trusted couriers), however,
quantum information science has turned up a surprising solution which is discussed in the
next section.
1.2 Quantum Key Distribution
Quantum key distribution (QKD), a novel cryptographic technique for secure distribution
of secret keys between two parties (traditionally named Alice and Bob), is the first suc-
cessful quantum technology to emerge from quantum information science. QKD employs
quantum states to encode and transmit secure key bits. The security of QKD is guaranteed
by fundamental properties of quantum mechanical systems. Intuitively, any intermediate
measurement of a quantum state disturbs that state.
More formally, the no-cloning2 property [3] of quantum states guarantees that an ad-
versary cannot obtain a copy of the secret key without introducing detectable errors in
the system. The amount of errors in the quantum communication channel is described
by the quantum bit error ratio (QBER) which is analogous to the BER of classical chan-
nels. If the QBER is above a certain threshold (near 17% [1]), Alice and Bob assume that
1The bitwise XOR operation, often denoted with a ⊕ symbol, is equivalent to bitwise addition modulo
two.
2The No-Cloning theorem [3] of quantum information asserts that, assuming the rules of quantum
mechanics, it is not possible to copy an unknown quantum state with perfect fidelity.
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the eavesdropper (commonly named Eve) has intercepted the communication, and hence
the quantum exchange must be restarted. For QBER values below the threshold, the le-
gitimate parties apply classical post-processing techniques to clean the key of errors (see
section 3.6) and to reduce Eve’s information about the key below an infinitesimal value
(see section 3.7). For a comprehensive review of QKD and its security, see for example [1].
Unlike classical cryptography, QKD is able to provide long-term security [4] in addition
to being immune against future attacks employing quantum computers3. If an eaves-
dropper does not acquire the secret key during its establishment, there is no amount of
computational power which will allow her to obtain it at a later time. This statement is not
true for common cryptographic protocols. If Eve were to capture RSA-encrypted [6] data
and corresponding public-key communication today, she could start solving the underlying
factoring problem and, within a few years, gain access to the secret message which may
still contain valid sensitive information.
1.2.1 QKD Protocols
As mentioned, QKD utilizes quantum states as carriers of secure key bits. In principle,
the state of any quantum mechanical system could be employed. In practice, quantum
states of light are almost always used [1], because they can be transmitted at the fastest
possible speed with little decoherence over an optical fiber [7] or a free-space link [8] with
direct line of sight between the transmitter and the receiver. Most QKD protocols are
discrete-variable, based on photon polarization states, however, continuous-variable [9, 10]
ones, in which real amplitudes are measured instead of discrete events [1], have also been
developed and demonstrated. In general, QKD protocols accomplish the following three
steps:
1. Raw Key Exchange: Quantum states are created, transmitted over a quantum chan-
nel, and measured to establish a raw key.
2. Key Sifting : Only a subset of the measurements are selected according to the specifics
of the protocol. This step produces the sifted key.
3. Classical Post-Processing : Also known as key distillation, this step consists of classi-
cal procedures called error correction and privacy amplification, which are employed
to clean the sifted key of errors and to eliminate the information leaked out to the
3In 1994, Peter Shor formulated a quantum algorithm for fast (polynomial-time) factorization of
integers[5]. If and when scalable quantum computers are built, many commercial cryptographic schemes
such as RSA will be rendered completely insecure.
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Polarization State Dirac Notation Basis Bit Value
Horizontal |H〉 H/V (+) 0
Vertical |V 〉 H/V (+) 1
Diagonal |D〉 D/A (×) 0
Anti-Diagonal |A〉 D/A (×) 1
Table 1.1: BB84 polarization state encoding.
adversary (see chapter 3). At the end of this step, Alice and Bob share an identi-
cal secure key, or, if the QBER is above a security threshold determined by formal
proofs of the QKD protocol’s security [1], the sifted key is discarded and the proto-
col restarts at step 1. Note that Alice and Bob require an authenticated4 classical
communication channel to complete this step.
QKD protocols differ only in the first two steps, while classical post-processing is generally
studied separately.
BB84
The first QKD protocol, BB84, is named after its creators Bennett and Brassard who
invented QKD in 1984. BB84 is a prepare-and-measure scheme in which Alice encodes each
bit from her random key in one of the four polarization states as displayed in table 1.1.
Given this encoding, the protocol consists of the following steps [1]:
1. Raw Key Exchange: Alice uses a random number generator to create a random key.
Employing a single-photon source, she encodes each bit of the key (0 or 1) with the
polarization state encoding from table 1.1 and transmits the photon over to Bob
via the quantum channel. She makes random basis choices which she records. Bob
measures each received photon randomly in either the + or × basis.
2. Key Sifting : Alice and Bob communicate their basis choices over a classical channel.
They discard those measurements (about half) which are performed in non-matching
bases.
3. Classical Post-Processing : As in the general case, Alice and Bob perform error correc-
tion (EC) and privacy amplification (PA) using the classical communication channel.
4Authentication prevents Eve from modifying any messages exchanged over the classical communication
channel. A small amount of secret key is needed to authenticate each party. That is why QKD is sometimes
referred to as a key-growing procedure.
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If the QBER is above the security threshold, the sifted key is discarded and the
protocol is restarted.
1.2.2 BB84 with Decoy States
A significant drawback of BB84 as formulated above is the assumption that each informa-
tion carrier is a single photon. In practice, it is very difficult to create high-rate sources of
perfect single photons.
In quantum mechanics, states containing exactly n photons are known as Fock states,
denoted as |n〉 in Dirac notation. Pulsed lasers are the most convenient high-frequency and
high-intensity sources of monochromatic light for QKD. However, instead of Fock states,
a pulsed laser generates coherent states of the form






where µ = |α|2 is the average photon number [1] per laser pulse. Thus, there is a non-
zero probability that each resulting pulse of light contains more than one photon. This
imperfection gives rise to the photon number splitting attack [11], in which Eve captures
one photon from each multi-photon pulse, stores it, and measures it (in the correct basis)
after Bob’s basis choices have been revealed. Hence, to minimize the multi-photon emission
probability, the laser pulses are attenuated and phase-randomized. This kind of source,
called a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source, is Poissonian, and the probability that a pulse
contains n photons is given by




However, signal attenuation severely limits the length of the quantum channel and hence
the total distance over which QKD can be performed. Decoy states [12, 13] were introduced
to overcome this practical problem. The main idea is that Alice can randomly vary the
average photon number of her coherent pulses, while the polarization encoding remains
unchanged from table 1.1. There are different decoy-state schemes, but in the simplest
case, there are only two kinds of states: signal states with average photon number µ,
and decoy states with average photon number ν. Only signal states contribute towards
secure key generation. Both µ and ν still need to be smaller than one to keep the multi-
photon probability low [14], but less attenuation is required for signal pulses (e.g. µ = 0.5)
compared to BB84 without decoy states [13].
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Since the adversary has no way of measuring the average photon number levels, this
scheme allows the legitimate parties to bound Eve’s information obtained from multi-
photon events. The bound is provided by information-theoretic security proofs [14] and
ultimately relates to the required amount of privacy amplification. A detailed example of
one such protocol and its theoretic bounds is discussed below.
Vacuum+Weak Decoy-State Protocol
The QKD experiment described in this thesis (see chapter 2) implements the vacuum+weak
decoy-state protocol [14], in which the source randomly emits signal states with average
photon number µ, or decoy states that are either vacuum “pulses” or have an average
photon number ν < µ. The authors of [14] show that this protocol behaves close to
optimal in their simulations.
In our implementation, Alice employs a polarization and intensity modulator [15] (see
section 2.2.1), to prepare a random sequence of BB84 polarization encodings which are 92%
signal and 8% decoy states; vacuum states are “sent” between successive laser pulses [16].
The average photon number values (µ = 0.5 and ν = 0.1) are chosen according to the
optimization procedure described in [14].
According to the asymptotic-key formalism from [14], the lower bound for the final
asymptotic secure key rate per laser pulse, R is given by
R = qLµν
{








• q is a basis reconciliation factor, which for BB84 is equal to 1/2, since we expect
Alice and Bob to agree on their basis choices for only half of the measurements.
• Lµν = NµNµ+Nν is the fraction of all photon detections attributed to signal states.
• Qµ/ν is the gain for signal/decoy states. The gain is calculated as the ratio of number
of photons received by Bob to number of pulses sent by Alice.
• ηEC (Eµ) is the efficiency parameter of the error correction algorithm (see section 3.6).
• H2 is the binary entropy function. Eµ is the QBER estimate for signal states.
• QL1 and EL1 are lower bounds of the gain and QBER for single photon pulses.
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where Y0 is the vacuum yield. Y0 is determined by the cumulative rate of detector dark
counts and background noise within the coincidence window (see section 3.4), and is mea-
sured between successive laser pulses.




















where Eν is the QBER estimate for decoy states, and E0 = 0.5 is the vacuum error rate.
In our experiment, the parameters in equations (1.4) and (1.7) are estimated from
experimental data to obtain the asymptotic lower bound for the secret key rate per laser
pulse, R, as defined in equation (1.3). To obtain the secure key rate in bits per secoind, R
is multiplied by the output rate of the WCP source (see section 2.2).
Finite-Size Effects
The expression for the secret key rate per laser pulse given in equation (1.3) follows the
asymptotic-key formalist, in which the rate is calculated assuming the raw key is of infinite
length. This assumption is obviously unrealistic for QKD implementations with finite
resources. In practice, the raw key is broken up into blocks of certain size and the full
protocol is performed on each block of key (see chapter 3). With terrestrial links, Alice
and Bob can simply perform the quantum state exchange step until a sufficient amount of
raw key is established in order to form a large-enough block. With satellite links however,
the parties have only a limited time to establish a key, and significant losses in the channel
lead to short raw keys over a single satellite passage [18] (see section 5.4.2).
The topic of QKD security proofs with finite resources has only been studied re-
cently [19], and ongoing research continues to re-examine all protocols. Unfortunately,
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decoy-state protocols are one of those QKD schemes for which the finite-key analysis is
incomplete. Nevertheless, there have been several attempts at an approximate analy-
sis [14, 17, 20, 21].
Based on finite-size analysis for single-photon sources, current approximations [17, 20,
21] arrive at the following correction to equation (1.3)
R = qLµν
{






















∆(n) = ∆1(n) + ∆2(n) (1.11)
• ∆1(n) is a correction accounting for the smooth min-entropy of n bits [19, 20], which
is the first term in equation (1.9). The second term accounts for privacy amplification.
• ∆2(n) is a correction accounting for additional information leaked out during error
correction.
• The security parameters εEC and εPA are the failure probabilities of error correction
and privacy amplification respectively. The smoothing parameter, ε̄ comes from the
theory of smooth min-entropy and is optimized numerically [17] along with εPE.
In Cai and Scarani’s formalism [17], the maximum failure probability of the entire QKD
protocol is quantified by ε, and is equal to the sum of the failure probabilities for each step
of the protocol:
ε = εEC + ε̄+ nPE εPE + εPA (1.12)
where nPE is the total number of parameters which need to be estimated, and εPE is the
failure probability of the parameter estimation procedure. In a sense, ε is a global security
parameter (for the whole protocol) which can be set according to the cryptographer’s
failure tolerance requirements (e.g. ε = 10−6).
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Furthermore, in a real-world QKD implementation, all measured quantities will be
fluctuating to some extent, so the theoretical bounds might be incorrect if averaged values
are used in the formulas. In other words, another correction is necessary to account for
statistical fluctuations of the parameters involved in the calculation of Eve’s information.
Several authors [18, 21–23] resort to a simple solution, in which 10 standard deviations are
either added to or subtracted from each measured parameter so that the lowest possible
bound for the secure key rate is obtained.
One major problem with this argument is that the amount of fluctuation allowed by
the model has no direct relation to the security of the final key. Sun et al. [21] simply
claim that 10σ should be “good enough” because the probability that the parameters fall
outside the range (measured value ±10σ) is less than 10−25. Other authors [22, 23] also
tend to repeat the 10 σ assumption with no rigorous justification.
Here is a simple example relating to our experiment (see chapter 2) which demonstrates
that this approach might not be ideal. Our quantum receiver exhibits, on average, about 95
background events+dark counts per second. These counts follow a Poissonian distribution,
so the standard deviation is σ =
√
95 ≈ 9.7, and 10 σ ≈ 97. Hence, Y0 is either reduced to
0 or doubled if 10 standard deviations are subtracted or added respectively. The problem
is that, at very high channel loss (e.g. above 55 dB), our legitimate detection rates do
not go far above the background rates, and thus doubling Y0 essentially “cancels out” the
signal.
A better approach, based on the law of large numbers, is proposed by Cai and Scarani [17].
Suppose a parameter λ ∈
{
Qµ/ν , Eµ/ν , Y0
}
is estimated with a finite number m of samples.
Then the estimate λm differs from the ideal value λ∞ by at most δ(m, d):




2 ln(1/εPE) + d ln(m+ 1)
m
(1.13)
where d is the number of outcomes from the measurement5 of λm. The upper and lower
bounds for each parameter are then given by
λU = min(λ+ δ, 1), λL = max(λ− δ, 0) (1.14)
As mentioned, this analysis still provides only an estimate of the finite-size effects on
the secret key rate. Note that each effect is treated separately and statistical fluctuations
are added-on at the end. So far, for decoy-state QKD, there has been no rigorous treatment
which considers statistical fluctuations from the onset of the security proof.
5A generalized measurement, which in quantum mechanics is performed with a positive-operator valued
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Figure 1.1: Illustration of QKD with a satellite used as a trusted node. An orbiting LEO
satellite allows locations A and B to communicate securely over a classical link (red) by
establishing a secret key with each location through a free-space QKD uplink.
1.3 Satellite-Based QKD
1.3.1 Motivation and Overview
Although QKD has been demonstrated experimentally and commercially deployed [24, 25],
current implementations are range-limited to quantum links of up to 260 km in optical
fiber [7, 26, 27] and 144 km over free-space [28]. Despite future technological advances, the
range of point-to-point terrestrial links is not expected to grow past 400 km [27]. Beyond
this distance, the signal-to-noise ratio of the quantum channel drops below practical values
due to transmission losses and decoherence effects. In fiber links for example, the loss
grows exponentially with distance [14]. Free-space links are limited by the the curvature
of the Earth, as well as by atmospheric transmission losses.
In classical communications systems, optical repeaters/amplifiers are commonly em-
ployed to periodically boost the classical signal along a long-distance link. Due to the
no-cloning theorem, they cannot be used for QKD. Instead, specially designed quantum
repeaters [29] are required for quantum signals. However, such repeaters require quantum
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memories in order to implement the entanglement swapping protocol—a procedure for
transferring the quantum properties of one quantum system (e.g. photon) onto another
via intermediate quantum teleportation steps. Quantum memories are unfortunately still
at the fundamental research stage and nowhere near the technological maturity [30] nec-
essary for practical QKD applications.
An alternative solution to this scalability problem is to deploy QKD over free-space
links to satellite platforms. Such orbiting intermediate nodes can then bridge multiple
local QKD networks [31, 32] on the ground in order to form a global QKD network. In
recent years, there have been several different proposals [28, 33–41] for satellite-based QKD
involving one or more spacecraft, in either geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) or low Earth
orbit (LEO), used as either trusted or untrusted nodes.
Even though multi-satellite proposals exist[42], initial proof-of-principle missions will
likely employ just one. One intuitive approach is to put a source of entangled photons on an
orbiting spacecraft and use a protocol such as BBM92 [43]. Conversely, if we preserve the
same triangular configuration and reverse the links, quantum uplinks from the ground could
be combined in a Bell state measurement [44] on the satellite, potentially demonstrating
device-independent QKD [45]. The advantage of these schemes is that the satellite does
not need to be trusted—an eavesdropper can be detected even if she has full control of
the satellite. The downside is that, to maximize the total key distribution distance and
elevation angles [18], the spacecraft needs to be placed far away from Earth, likely in
GEO. Such distances and associated losses are unfortunately not yet possible to overcome
technologically.
Alternatively, we can loosen the security requirement a bit and treat the satellite as a
trusted node. In that case, an LEO (altitude of up to 1000 km) spacecraft can establish
a secret key (e.g. via the BB84 protocol) with one or more ground stations as it orbits
around the Earth. In the simplest case, two distant locations A and B can establish a
secret key, X and Y respectively, with the satellite as illustrated in figure 1.1. For A and
B to share a key, the satellite needs to send (X ⊕ Y) to B (over the classical channel), so
that B can obtain X by using its key Y as follows:
(X⊕Y) ⊕ Y = X ⊕ (Y⊕Y) (1.15)
= X ⊕ 0 (1.16)
= X (1.17)
The above procedure essentially amounts to one-time pad encryption (the satellite encrypts
A’s key with B’s key) and decryption (see section 1.1).
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This trusted-node scheme is the most technologically feasible in the near term due to
the shorter free-space link compared to GEO (leading to tolerable channel loss) as well as
the overall reduced complexity (one link established at a time). Its main drawback is that
it is less secure—it requires that the satellite store the secret key obtained from location A
until the key with ground station B is established. Hence, extra precautions must be taken
to ensure that an eavesdropper cannot access the (classical) memory on the spacecraft.
1.3.2 The QEYSSat Mission Proposal
A number of satellite-based quantum communications missions [46–49] are currently under
development and expected to launch in the near future [47]. One such mission is the Cana-
dian Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) which envisions a photonic
uplink to an LEO microsatellite that acts as a trusted node for QKD and a platform for
fundamental quantum physics experiments [49, 50]. QEYSSat is a collaborative project
involving Canadian universities, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) and several industry
partners (COM DEV, INO, Neptec).
The proposed spacecraft will carry a special “quantum payload” comprising a quantum
receiver (similar to the one described in section 2.3) capable of analyzing photon polar-
ization, as well as an integrated QKD data acquisition, processing and key management
system necessary to implement the trusted-node scheme illustrated in figure 1.1. The satel-
lite will receive photonic signals sent upwards from optical ground stations, while dedicated
RF stations nearby will provide two-way classical communication links. In the current pro-
posal, QEYSSat is based on COM DEV’s Advanced Integrated Microsatellite (AIM) bus
employed on a similar spacecraft, the Maritime Monitoring and Messaging Microsatellite
(M3MSat) [50].
An important consideration for this mission is the choice between a photonic quantum
uplink (source located on the ground) or downlink (source located on the satellite). De-
tailed analysis and simulations of each link scenario can be found in a recent publication
by Bourgoin et al. [18]. Most studies in the past have concentrated solely on downlink pro-
posals, based on the fact that uplinks suffer from additional loss induced by atmospheric
turbulence. The effects of turbulence on beam propagation are mostly negligible above the
first 20 km of Earth’s atmosphere [51], and hence, uplinks and downlink are affected dif-
ferently. In a downlink, turbulence is present only at the end of the transmission path and
has little impact on the light beam. For an uplink however, turbulence can be a significant
problem, which can be resolved by adaptive optics and/or a good choice of ground station
location [18]. Further details and analysis of all factors affecting beam propagation and
channel loss can be found in [18].
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On the other hand, an uplink implementation is very appealing from a practical point
of view. Current high-frequency photon sources are very complex, have relatively high
power requirements, and often require regular maintenance; all these factors make them
unsuitable (see appendix A) as a satellite payload. Conversely, a source on the ground
can be easily updated as technology progresses. This versatile design allows for different
types of sources to be used, and a range of quantum mechanics experiments to be per-
formed [52]. Furthermore, a quantum receiver is much simpler than a source and many
of its components, such as single-photon detectors, have already flown in space [53]. The
uplink scenario has many additional advantages owing to its reduced complexity and lower
storage, processing, and classical communications requirements (see chapter 4).
In the following chapters, this thesis presents some of the research conducted towards
feasibility studies of the QEYSSat mission. In particular, it focuses on the necessary data
processing algorithms (chapter 3) and their computing resource requirements (chapter 4)
on the satellite. It also details the design (chapter 2) and performance (chapter 5) of a






This chapter describes the experimental setup employed to model QKD with a satellite
uplink. Our experiment builds upon an earlier version of the apparatus, detailed in [15, 16,
54]. Its recent evolution includes the addition of a full quantum optical receiver, automated
polarization alignment, more realistic timing synchronization and the implementation of a
full QKD protocol.
Author contributions
Evan Meyer-Scott built and characterized the original photon source [16, 54]. Zhizhong
Yan developed the FPGA-controlled telecom intensity and polarization modulator [15].
Jean-Philippe Bourgoin and Brendon Higgins designed and constructed the new quantum
receiver. Thomas Jennewein and Brendon Higgins provided guidance and supervision
throughout the project.
My main contribution to this experiment was in efficient post-processing as described
in detail in chapter 3. I added more hardware for timing analysis and integrated the live
data streams coming from the source, receiver, time-taggers and GPS units into the QKD
software. I worked with Zhizhong Yan to analyze the polarization state distribution and
QBER stability of the telecom modulator (section 2.2.1), and I optimized the decoy-state
levels for better key rates. I performed the QKD experiment together with Jean-Philippe




The quantum components of a practical QKD system typically consist of a quantum source,
a transmission medium (quantum channel) and a quantum receiver. Most discrete-variable
QKD implementations employ either a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source [7, 55–58], or a
source emitting entangled photon pairs [42, 59–63]. The quantum signals are transmitted
either over optical fiber [7] or over a free-space link [8] with direct line of sight between the
transmitter and the receiver. Quantum receivers typically incorporate two or more photon
detectors which are characterized by their detection efficiency (at a given wavelength) and
dark count rate1.
In the challenging case of a satellite uplink (see section 1.3), the quantum source is
required to have a very high repetition rate to overcome the considerable losses in the
free-space channel. In addition, the emitted photons should have short pulse widths to
enable accurate temporal filtering (see section 3.4). A decoy-state WCP source imple-
mented with a mode-locked laser, such as a titanium-sapphire (Ti:Sapph) laser, can satisfy
these requirements. However, this kind of source produces unwanted phase correlations be-
tween consecutive laser pulses, and thus violates an important assumption of QKD security
proofs [57, 64].
To overcome this shortcoming, our source has a hybrid design based on a process known
as sum-frequency generation (SFG) or upconversion in which the absorption of multi-
ple photons of lower energy (longer wavelength) results in the emission of higher-energy
(shorter wavelength) photons. As described in [15, 16, 54] and section 2.2.2, the source
combines two laser beams—one coming from a mode-locked Ti:Sapph laser at 810 nm, and
another generated by a continuous wave (CW) telecom laser operating at 1550 nm—to
produce photons at 532 nm. In this design, phase randomization is provided by the CW
telecom laser. Intensity and polarization modulation (section 2.2.1) is also accomplished
at the telecom band for which fast and reliable commercial modulation components are
readily available. The resulting wavelength (532 nm) of the output light is engineered in
such a way as to be suitable for single photon detectors with the best figure of merit [65].
The output photons are sent over a short (≈ 1 m) free-space channel with controllable
loss, which attempts to emulate the high-loss environment of a satellite uplink. After
the lossy link, the remaining photons are detected with our quantum receiver (section 2.3).
The receiver contains low-dark-count thin silicon avalanche photo diode (Si-APD) detectors
whose efficiency is optimal for photons of wavelength around 532 nm.
1A detector dark count is a false-positive detection event which is intrinsic to the detector and not
caused by external light.
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2.2 Weak Coherent Pulse Source
Our weak coherent pulse (WCP) source consists of two subsystems, an FPGA-controlled
intensity and polarization telecom modulator (section 2.2.1) and an upconversion com-
ponent (section 2.2.2). Both components work in unison to produce a pseudo-random
sequence of polarization states encoded in short, phase-correlation-free light pulses.
2.2.1 Modulation Subsystem
Our high-speed telecom modulation system is built with commercially available ectro-
optic (EO) amplitude and phase, lithium niobate waveguide modulators arranged in a
balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) configuration. As depicted in figure 2.1
(a), the polarization of the input light coming from a tunable CW telecom laser is first
manually adjusted (via FPC 1) so that each arm of the polarization beam splitter (PBS)
receives equal beam intensity. Before entering the insulated and temperature-controlled
box, the beam goes through the intensity modulator which implements signal and decoy
states (see section 1.2.2). Within the box, each MZI arm contains a phase modulator.
This configuration allows, for example, the control of the relative phase between H and V
polarizations produced when the two beams recombine at the polarization beam combiner
(PBC). Thus, any of the four polarization states (H, V, D or A) required for decoy-state
BB84 can be generated by applying a certain combination of voltage settings to the EO
phase modulators, while the signal/decoy levels are controlled by the voltage setting of the
intensity modulator.
The settings of all modulators are controlled by a field programmable gate array
(FPGA) driver circuit. The FPGA system clock is driven by an external 76 MHz TTL
signal derived from the mode-locked Ti:Sapph laser and a pulse shaping circuit. The dig-
ital encodings produced by the FPGA are translated to corresponding analog signals via
fast digital-to-analog converter (D/A) circuits. Finally, the analog signals are amplified by
three RF driving amplifiers (DRVs) which are DC coupled to the corresponding RF ports
(IM, PM A and PM B) on the EO modulators.
The FPGA is programmed to produce a pseudo-random sequence of polarization states
(H, V, D or A) in which the signal (µ = 0.5) or decoy (ν = 0.1) level settings of the average
photon number per pulse also vary in a pseudo-random way. Furthermore, decoy states
account for about 8% of the total number of modulated pulses. For timing synchronization,
the FPGA board periodically produces a single TTL signal indicating that 128 states have
been modulated. This signal is accurately timed-stamped by Alice’s time-tagging unit and
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Figure 2.1: (a) Schematic representation of the FPGA-controlled intensity and polariza-
tion telecom modulator from [15]. Yellow and blue lines represent standard single-mode
and polarization-maintaining fiber (SMF and PMF) respectively. Red × marks denote
FC/PC connectors. Manual fiber polarization controllers (FPC 1 and FPC 2) are located
at the input and output fibers. A mode-locked Ti:Sapph laser with repetition rate of
≈76 MHz drives the FPGA controller board, which in turn drives the intensity (IM), and
phase (PM A and PM B) modulators. (b) and (c) Photographs of the modulators and
polarization beam splitters/combiners (PBS/PBC) where (c) shows the interior of the in-
sulated box, temperature-controlled by a Thorlabs TC-200 controller, containing two phase
modulators, a PBS and a PBC.
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Figure 2.2: Generation of decoy-state BB84 states through upconversion of two pump laser
beams in a polarization-compensated PPKTP crystal pair. The 810 nm beam (marked red)
is produced by a pulsed Ti:Sapph laser, while the modulated 1550 nm beam (marked yellow)
originates from a CW telecom laser. The resulting photons (green) at 532 nm inherit
desirable properties from each pump source: the Ti:Sapph laser provides high repetition
rate and short pulse width, while phase randomization, and intensity and polarization
modulation are accomplished on the telecom side. Figure from [15].
is eventually used by the coincidence algorithm (see section 3.4) to generate matching pairs
of photon emission–detection events.
2.2.2 Upconversion Subsystem
Once the 1550 nm photon beam has been modulated (as per the previous section), it
is combined through SFG with another beam coming from a pulsed Ti:Sapph laser at
810 nm to produce upconverted green photons at 532 nm. The two laser beams are brought
together into two orthogonal type-I periodically-poled (PP) potassium titanyl phosphate
(KTP) crystals. The resulting upconversion process is illustrated in figure 2.2. Details on
how SFG works can be found, for example, in [54]. In accordance with our decoy-state
BB84 QKD scheme (section 1.2.2), the beam power of each pump laser is adjusted so that
the average photon number of the output pulses is around 0.47.
The main idea behind this hybrid design is to impart desirable properties from each
pump source to the resulting photons. As mentioned, the Ti:Sapph laser provides high
repetition rate and short pulse width, while the CW telecom laser ensures phase random-
ization. The polarization of the 810 nm photons coming from the Ti:Sapph is fixed at
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Laser (810 nm) 
USB 
Split off 1% of photons for 
source characterization 
Upconverted 
light (532 nm) 
Figure 2.3: System-level schematic of the WCP source as part of the overall decoy-state
BB84 QKD system. After Alice produces her desired photon states via telecom modulation
and upconversion, she measures 1% of the green photons for source characterization, dis-
cards 9% and sends the remaining 90% of upconverted photons over the quantum channel
where the loss is controlled through a movable lens. Bob then detects transmitted light
with the quantum receiver. Both parties communicate classically over the LAN. Figure
modified from [16, 54] with permission.
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Figure 2.4: A lens mounted on a translation stage allows for control of the loss in the
quantum channel by manipulation of the beam size. To the right, upconverted green
photons exit a coupler to the single mode fiber carrying the output beam. The quantum
receiver is located further away to the left.
|D〉 = |H〉+ |V 〉√
2
(2.1)
Since the output intensity of the 532 nm photons depends linearly [66] on the input intensi-
ties of the 810 nm and 1550 nm photons, we can modulate the output beam by keeping the
Ti:Sapph intensity stable and using fast telecom modulators (see section 2.2.1) to modify
the polarization and intensity of the 1550 nm beam.
Figure 2.3 displays a system-level schematic of the WCP source as part of the overall
decoy-state BB84 QKD system. Alice prepares a sequence of photon states via telecom
modulation (figure 2.1) and upconversion (figure 2.2). The reference signal from the FPGA-
controlled modulation system is time-stamped by the time-tagger unit. The resulting time-
tags are transferred in real-time to Alice’s computer over USB where they are analyzed
(together with the ones from Bob) to produce the raw and sifted keys (see chapter 3).
Using two 90-10 fibre beamsplitters connected in series, Alice splits off and measures 1%
of the green photons for source characterization, discards 9% and sends the remaining 90%
of upconverted photons over the quantum channel to Bob. The loss in the quantum channel
is controlled through a lens mounted on a translation stage (figure 2.4). The position of the
lens determines the size of the light beam arriving at the quantum receiver (section 2.3).




















Figure 2.5: Schematic representation of our quantum receiver implementing measurement
of the BB84 polarization states: horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D) and anti-diagonal
(A). A wave plate triplet placed in motorized rotation stages is used for our automated
polarization alignment procedure.
Bob communicate classically over the local area network (LAN) to complete the classical
post-processing steps of the QKD protocol (see chapter 3).
2.3 Quantum Receiver
Once Alice has prepared and sent her quantum states with her WCP source as described
in section 2.2, Bob must measure the transmitted qubits to complete the quantum part of
the QKD protocol. Traditionally, QKD experiments implement Bob’s measurement with
optical elements arranged in a single plane on a breadboard. However, such configuration
is not very suitable for a satellite payload as it is not very compact. As a proof of concept,
our quantum receiver is built from commercially available components organized in a three-
21
dimensional robust frame. It features spectral filtering, passive basis choice, automated
polarization alignment, and few moving parts. A design schematic of the receiver is shown
in figure 2.5 and photographs are provided in figure 2.6.
The quantum receiver is built with several Thorlabs cage systems. Each consists of four
6 mm-thick stainless steel rods which form a rectangular box or cage along the direction
of the optical axis. Each box is terminated on both sides by rigid square elements (with
30 mm or 60 mm sides) to which the rods attach. Optical components are mounted along
this structure [67]. The receiver is made up of three subsystems attached together to a
small (12 in × 6 in) breadboard:
• Telescope
• Polarization compensation unit
• Polarization measurement module (i.e. “Bob module”)
The telescope collects a small portion of the uncollimated input beam coming from the
source and reduces its diameter before passing it on to the polarization compensation unit.
The telescope consists of two lenses located at the extremities of a 60 mm cage. The large
lens has a 2 in diameters and a 250 mm focal length, while the small lens has a 6 mm
diameter and a 10 mm focal length.
The polarization compensation unit consists of a wave plate triplet: a half wave plate
(HWP) placed between two quarter wave plates (QWPs). The wave plates are mounted
on motorized rotation stages which are controlled by a Newport XPS Universal High-
Performance Motion Controller/Driver [68]. The triplet is employed in our automated
polarization alignment procedure described in section 3.5. In brief, this set of wave plates
can implement an arbitrary polarization correction and a change-of-basis for measuring
circular polarizations.
Bob’s polarization analysis module is used to measure incoming photons, and hence
to decode the quantum information they carry. As illustrated in figure 2.5, the quantum
state of each photon is collapsed to one of the four BB84 polarization states: horizontal
(H), vertical (V), diagonal (D) and anti-diagonal (A).
In the BB84 protocol, Bob needs to select which basis, H/V or D/A, to use for each
polarization measurement. Since we aim to have few moving parts, our receiver implements
the basis choice passively with a non-polarizing pentaprism beam splitter. In addition to
the standard two ports (which each receive ≈ 47.5% of the input beam), this custom beam
splitter has a third port which could potentially be used for beacon detection or for a
source going in the reverse direction.
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Figure 2.6: Photographs of the quantum receiver. The green arrows indicate the direction
of the input beam which enters the receiver through the telescope. The beam then under-
goes polarization compensation via the motorized wave plate triplet before it is analyzed
by the passive basis choice “Bob module”.
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At each of the two main ports of the pentaprism, one for each measurement basis,
there is a 30 mm cage system containing a 5 mm polarizing beam splitter cube (PBS) and
a pair of perpendicular detection cage units. As shown in figure 2.6, to implement the
measurement in the D/A basis, the cage system at the straight-through (primary) output
of the pentaprism is rotated 45◦ around the optical axis. The measurement in the H/V
basis is accomplished at the secondary output.
Each of the detection cage units is terminated with a narrow-band filter (for spectral
filtering) and a thin silicon single photon avalanche diode (SPAD) module from Micro
Photon Devices (MPD) [69] attached to an X-Y translation stage for precise position
alignment. To focus the beam onto the 50 µm active area of the detector, a 50 mm focal
length lens is placed in front of each detector. At the output wavelength (532 nm) of our
WCP source, these detectors have a high figure of merit [65], H > 108, and hence they have
high detection efficiency (≈ 48%), low dark count rate (10-25 counts per second), and low
timing jitter (<100 ps) allowing for precise temporal filtering (see section 3.4). Detection
events from the SPAD modules are time-stamped with our fast time-tagging hardware
(see section 3.1) which has a timing resolution of 76 ps. Each time stamp (denoting when
the event happened) and channel information (indicating which detector was triggered)
is transferred out of the time-tagger over a standard USB link and read in by the QKD
software (see chapter 3).
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Chapter 3
Data Acquisition and Processing
Our QKD system consists of two main sub-systems traditionally named Alice and Bob. In
our setup, Alice is the “ground-station” component acting as the quantum source, while
Bob is the “satellite” component acting as the quantum receiver. Data are collected by
Alice and Bob via dedicated timing hardware (section 3.1). In addition to the time-tagging
infrastructure, computing facilities on each side are required to implement a full QKD post-
processing protocol (section 3.2). In a real system, there will be a ground-station server and
a low-power embedded computer onboard the satellite. In our lab system, two standard
x86-64 desktop computers are used on each side and the local area network (LAN) acts
as a classical communication channel (section 3.3). However, the desktop computer on
Bob’s side is only used to record the experimental data, while all the satellite-side data
processing is done by a low-power ARM-based board.
3.1 Data Acquisition Hardware
This project is done in partnership with DotFast Consulting, which is providing the hard-
ware, firmware and driver software used for time-tagging of significant events (e.g. photon
detections) with sub-nanosecond precision. Such precision is needed to correctly identify
corresponding events from the source and receiver systems within a very narrow time win-
dow (coincidence window). Good resolution is required for temporal filtering, to ensure
that a high signal-to-noise ratio for the quantum signal is obtained. The overall accuracy of
the event timestamps, or time-tags, is mainly affected by the jitter in the photon detectors
and the clock synchronization of the time-tagging devices at the source and the receiver.
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Figure 3.1: QKD data acquisition hardware in a NIM crate. Bob’s time-tagger (on the
left) attaches precise time-stamps to signals produced by the single-photon detectors in
the quantum receiver (section 2.3) and the GPS unit. Alice’s time-tagger (middle) is
connected to the second GPS unit, the FPGA modulator (section 2.2) and the adjacent
single-photon detector (SPD). Both time-taggers output their data streams (towards Alice
or Bob’s computer) via a standard USB link. On the right is a four-channel SPD used to
detect characterization photons split-off from the source as shown in figure 2.3.
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3.2 Post-Processing Protocol Overview
The quantum part of our QKD scheme ends when the source and the receiver finish ex-
changing quantum signals in the form of polarized photons (see section 1.2). The rest of
the QKD protocol is purely classical and is done in software. The software is designed to
perform the following general steps [1]:
1. Storage of time-tags and corresponding measurement results.
2. Exchange of timing information between Alice and Bob and extraction of coincident
photon detection events (coincidences). This step produces the raw key.
3. Exchange of basis information for each coincidence and sifting down to only those
events where the same polarization basis choice was made. The sifted key is produced.
This step and the previous are performed by the coincidence analysis algorithm, which
is described in detail in section 3.4.
4. Execution of a one-way error correction algorithm based on low density parity check
(LDPC) codes [70]. Bob computes his syndrome information and sends it to Al-
ice who performs belief propagation decoding [71, 72]. The error-corrected key is
produced. The LDPC error-correction algorithm is discussed in section 3.6.
5. Estimation of the quantum bit-error ratio (QBER) of the channel and execution of
Toeplitz matrix based [73] privacy amplification (see section 3.7) is performed by
Alice and Bob. This final step gives the final key.
3.3 Software Design
The design of the software follows the general rule that Alice must perform as many of
the computation-intensive tasks as possible, since the ground station can be made rich in
computing resources with relative ease. Hence, Alice must execute the timing analysis,
coincidence searching, sifting and belief propagation decoding algorithms. Alice is also
responsible for time-tag readout at a very high rate (the source rate, as seen in section 2.2,
is very high in an uplink scenario), as well as real-time display of statistics from the
experiment.
The design of our data acquisition and processing system is depicted in figure 3.2. It
consists of two time-tagger units, two x86-64 computers and an ARM board connected via
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simplified API for time-tag readout
Efficient C program (separate process)
  - XML-RPC client for data readout
  - Optimized QKD core: 
    sifting, error correction, privacy amplification
  - Perform as few computation-intensive
    tasks as possible







Figure 3.2: High-level software design. Alice’s software (which runs on relatively powerful
hardware) consists of an integrated solution written in C#, designed to perform as much
as possible the computationally intensive operations of the QKD protocol. Bob’s software
(which runs on modest low-power hardware) consists of a small C# layer handling platform-
dependent operations, acting in unison with an efficient C program that performs the
necessary portions of the QKD protocol at the receiver side.
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pulse-per-second (1 PPS) signals coming from a GPS receiver. The signals from the source
are connected to Alice’s time-tagger and the four outputs of Bob’s detectors are connected
to Bob’s time-tagger.
Alice’s software consists of a C# program originally based upon a software package writ-
ten by Chris Erven at IQC, which has been significantly modified/rewritten and greatly
expanded. It is currently capable of performing data recording, automated polarization
alignment (section 3.5), coincidence and sifting algorithms (section 3.4), LDPC error cor-
rection (section 3.6), privacy amplification (section 3.7) as well as displaying live statistics
from the experiment.
Bob’s software is separated into two components: a driving control environment and an
embedded component. The driving control component is written in C#. It is responsible
for all platform-dependent tasks, e.g. loading Windows time-tagger drivers, configuring
time-taggers, reading out time-tags and displaying live statistics in Windows widgets. With
our setup, we aim to simulate/estimate in some way the limited-resource environment
on the satellite. The actual satellite design is not yet established, so Bob’s embedded
software component needs to be implemented in a platform-independent way. It can then
be executed as a separate entity on the x86-64 desktop computer or on our low-power ARM
developer board. The embedded component is written entirely in C, which will allow it to
be easily ported to the platform of choice for the satellite mission. Ideally, we would have
preferred to use a single embedded system for Bob. However, the lack of Linux drivers for
the time-tagging hardware led us to adopt the present design. For better abstraction and
ease of implementation, the embedded component communicates with the environment
via remote-procedure calls (RPC). If needed, the RPC layer can be replaced by a more
appropriate mechanism, once the satellite bus design is finalized.
With this setup, we have been able to test the embedded code on an ARM-based devel-
oper board running a basic version of Linux. Since Bob’s embedded component runs in a
standalone process, its usage of computing resources can be accurately monitored. More-
over, the driving control environment component can keep track of the bandwidth used for
classical communication. The implementation of Bob’s software has been completed up to
and including the privacy-amplification stage of the protocol. We use this implementation
to guide our analysis of the computing requirements of Bob’s part of the QKD protocol.
Those are presented and thoroughly discussed in chapter 4.
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Figure 3.3: Screenshot of the software control panel at Alice (ground). Data rates at dif-
ferent channels of the time-tagger unit are displayed on the left, along with the time-tagger
status. The 4×4 matrix in the top middle displays the observed state characterization; the
numbers in blue represent the number of events when Alice and Bob’s state measurement
and basis choice coincide. The automated polarization alignment controls are located in
the top right corner. Below the running statistics such as QBER and channel loss is the

































Table 3.1: Sample data stream, collected from the experimental apparatus,
containing interleaved photon detection time-tags and serial messages. Serial
messages appear on channel 27, while channels 1 to 4 correspond to pho-
ton detections. Here, the data stream contains a section of the message:
$GPGGA,195713.00,4328.7438,N,08033.2876,W,0,07,00.0,00314.1,M,,,,*12 in the National
Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) 0183 message format
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3.4 Timing Analysis and Coincidence List Generation
Let us focus our attention to the problem of timing alignment of photon detection signals.
In our case, the source is producing quantum signals at rates of up to 76 MHz, while the
detection rates at the receiver usually vary from a few hundred counts per second up to
about 100 kHz depending on the loss in the quantum channel. The goal is to identify
exactly which photon emitted from the source corresponds to a given detection event at
the receiver. This task poses some practical challenges:
• Clock Rate Synchronization: Alice and Bob’s time-tagger clocks might not count
time at the same rate, leading to timing drifts.
• Frame Synchronization: Both time-taggers don’t start counting time at the exact
same instance, so Alice and Bob’s timing frames have an initial fixed offset.
• High Rate Periodic Source: The data acquisition hardware cannot operate at the
Ti:Sapph laser’s 76 MHz output rate.
• Variation in the Photons’ Time-of-Flight (TOF): In the lab, the photons’ TOF is
always constant, but in a real system the TOF will be continuously changing due to
the fast motion of the satellite (see figure 3.4).
To alleviate the unfeasibly heavy load on the time-tagger at the source, only one in 128
Ti:Sapph laser pulses is tagged. The signals in between are assumed to have been emitted
at regular intervals, that is, we assume that the laser’s period is stable for about 1.664 µs.
As discussed in section 2.2, the desired polarization and signal/decoy state of each pulse
in the known (only to Alice) sequence of 128 pulses is produced by the modulator.
For clock rate synchronization, the time-tagging units’ internal clocks are aligned to a
time-base signal of 10 MHz provided by a GPS receiver at each side. Frame synchronization
is achieved with the 1 PPS signal provided by the GPS receivers. Each GPS receiver also
supplies position data, which is used in conjunction with the time information to estimate
the distance between Alice and Bob, and hence, the TOF of the photons between the
source and the receiver.
As shown in table 3.1, the GPS time and position information is recorded within the
time-tagging system, thereby locking all time measurements to the time base of the time-
tagging system. This is important because the GPS data packet, containing position, speed
and direction of motion, and the corresponding time-stamp can be used to improve the
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Figure 3.4: Radial distance r(t) versus time plot (top) and corresponding timing offset
function δ(t) (bottom) for a “best” duration satellite pass [18] over Ottawa. Based on the
satellite’s radial distance data (top), the TOF of photons relative to an arbitrarily chosen
reference point (e.g. r0 = 500 km) gives the relative timing offset at each data point. A
smooth timing offset function δ(t) is obtained using a high-order polynomial fit (as shown
here), or an even more precise satellite-orbit model. An offset δ(ti) can then be added to
each time-tag ti coming from Bob’s time-tagger.
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orbit prediction, and hence, to calculate the TOF of photons to an error of at most 100 ns.
The main source of error is the jitter in 1 PPS signals coming from the GPS receiver.
Moreover, timing signals sent over a beacon laser to the satellite can be recorded on the
time-tagging system on the ground and the satellite, and provide additional information
about the TOF of optical signals. It is expected that this optical time-transfer can be
accurate to about 50 ns. Depending on the power budget and the bandwidth of the
beacon link, this accuracy might be significantly better (less than 1 ns).
3.4.1 Coincidence Algorithm
In our current lab system, photon detections are accurate to 78 ps, but 1 PPS signals are
accurate to 100 ns. Thus, additional analysis is required to identify corresponding emission
and detection events to within a desired coincidence window of about 0.3 ns to 2 ns. The
algorithm for alignment of photon detections at the satellite receiver with signals sent from
the ground source is a computationally expensive task. It is therefore best to assign it to
Alice on the ground. The algorithm is based on the timing information from Bob’s time-
tags, Alice’s transmitted photon states, Alice and Bob’s GPS timing and position data,
as well as a small subset (≈5%) of Bob’s measured outcomes. Sampling Bob’s outcomes
is necessary to identify the correct offset, because the WCP source currently employed
is periodic with a period of approximately 13 ns (as mentioned, the 1 PPS signals are
accurate to 100 ns).
Our implementation employs a histogram-based optimizing coincidence search within
a predefined time range (about 100 ns wide). Moreover, the information from the sampled
outcomes also comes in handy during the error correction stage of the QKD protocol (see
section 3.6). As discussed in section 1.3, all detection events are stored on the satellite
while it flies over an optical station and are only downloaded to the ground station server
when the satellite flies over an RF station. It is therefore essential that the coincidence
algorithm is executed in parallel on multiple frames, each frame containing a second’s worth
of data. The challenge becomes to distribute the data evenly among multiple computing
tasks/threads, without disrupting the temporal order of the frames. Our solution is to
assign an index to each frame:
Iframe = UTCsecond (mod Nq) (3.1)
Here, UTCsecond is the “seconds” field of the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) time-
stamp contained in the GPS data packet and Nq is the total number of processing queues
on the ground. Each queue is serviced by a C# Task [74], the CoincidenceTask, which in
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our case is mapped to a physical thread by the operating system (Windows 7). Since both
Alice and Bob have access to the GPS data packet, they can easily compute Iframe for
each frame and thus establish the correct ordering. Alice processes the frames in parallel
as soon as they arrive, while Bob requests the results from the queues in a round-robin
fashion. Each coincidence task
1. Generates a coincidence histogram as shown in algorithm 3.1.
2. Finds the correct peak from the histogram. As seen in figure 3.5, coincidence peaks
appear every 13 ns, matching the period of the Ti:Sapph laser. Only one peak has
the correct offset and QBER estimates from the previous step are needed to identify
it. This procedure is outlined in algorithm 3.2
3. Performs basis sifting. With the unbiased BB84 protocol (see section 1.2), about half
of the coincident events are discarded due to basis mismatch.
4. Generates the coincidence lists for Alice and Bob. Each list contains indices of the
emission/detection events which make up the sifted key. Bob’s coincidence list is
enqueued on the correct output queue. Bob can then receive the list over the classical
channel.
5. Performs decoy-state analysis and parameter estimation.
Algorithm Complexity
Even though the coincidence algorithm is performed on the ground, it needs to be suf-
ficiently efficient so that timing data is processed as soon as it is downloaded from the
satellite. Recall that all post-processing has to be accomplished within the duration of
the satellite pass over an RF station. The scalable parallelization (as discussed earlier) of
the coincidence algorithm ensures that its runtime can be reduced by simply adding more
CPU cores.
It is also important to analyze the overall complexity of processing one frame of data.
From algorithms 3.1 and 3.2, it can be seen that the runtime is linear in the number of
Bob’s time-tags. To show this result, let us define the following parameters treated as
constant factors:
• hs = histogram span [seconds]
• hb = histogram bin size [seconds]
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Algorithm 3.1: Coincidence histogram generation
Data: Two arrays of of timing and basis information, corresponding GPS data
packets and “1 PPS” signals for Alice and Bob
Result: A coincidence histogram, each column/bin storing a list of coincidences,
(emission, detection) event pairs, and estimated QBER
1 startShift = AlicePPS − BobPPS
/* the histogram span is the size of the time window covered by the
entire histogram, much larger than the coincidence window */
2 minShift = startShift − histogramSpan
3 maxShift = startShift + histogramSpan
4 foreach time-tag bi in Bob’s time-tag array b do
/* a0 is the first time-tag in Alice’s time-tag array a */
5 minIndex = (bi + minShift − a0) / sequencePeriodMax
6 j = minIndex
7 while all possible offsets for bi are accounted for in the histogram do
8 for k from 0 to sequenceLength do
9 AliceTag = aj + k ∗ sequencePeriod / sequenceLength
10 shift = AliceTag − bi
11 if shift < minShift then
/* shift is outside the left (negative offset) boundary of
the histogram */
12 k = k + (minShift − shift) / (sequencePeriod / sequenceLength)
13 end
14 else if shift > maxShift then
/* shift is outside the right (positive offset) boundary
of the histogram */
15 break (while loop)
16 end
17 else
/* update histogram bin (coincidence matrix, QBER
estimate, coincidence list) for that offset */






Algorithm 3.2: Coincidence peak finding
Data: A coincidence histogram as produced by algorithm 3.1, the size of the
coincidence window
Result: A subset of the histogram bins forming the correct coincidence peak, in the
form of a HistogramPeak object (optimalPeak)
/* Group consecutive histogram bins based on the coincidence window to
create all possible HistogramPeak objects. At creation, the offset
of a HistogramPeak is computed from a weighted average of the bin
counts */
1 peakSize = coinWindow / histogramBinSize
2 for i = 0 to (histogramLength − peakSize) do
3 peakList.Add(HistogramPeak(i, peakSize, histogram))
4 end
/* Sort the list of HistogramPeak objects by number of coincidences */
5 peakList.Sort()
6 topFraction = coinWindow / TiSapphPeriod
/* The first (topFraction ∗ peakList.Length) HistogramPeak objects in
the sorted peakList now contain the TiSapph peaks which repeat
periodically as seen in figure 3.5 */
7 optimalPeak = peakList[0]
8 minQBER = 1
9 for i = 1 to (topFraction ∗ peakList.Length) do
10 if peakList[i].qber < minQBER then
/* The optimal peak is the one with the smallest QBER */
11 optimalPeak = peakList[i]


















Loss: 25 dB Loss: 50 dB 
Loss: 55 dB Loss: 60 dB 
Figure 3.5: Coincidence histograms at different channel loss levels. Each column in a
histogram represents the number of time-tags having a given timing offset. Note the
significant drop of SNR as the loss in the channel increases and detection events due to
background light become more and more pronounced. Nevertheless, even at 60 dB, the
coincidence algorithm is able to correctly identify the peak (in light blue). This is an
example of temporal filtering.
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• w = coincidence window size [seconds]
• Nb = number of detection events at the receiver (Bob) per one second frame
• Ls = length of repeating pseudo-random sequence
• Tlaser = Period of Ti:Sapph laser


























Steps 3 and 4 consist of simply iterating through all (≤ Nb) coincidence pairs, so the
complexity is Θ(Nb). Finally, step 5 takes constant time.
Thus, the overall complexity (per frame of data) of the coincidence algorithm is Θ(Nb).
Multiple frames are processed in parallel depending on the number of available CPU cores.
3.5 Automated Polarization Alignment
Author Contributions
Brendon Higgins developed the polarization analysis (utilizing existing quantum state to-
mography code written by Nathan Langford) and compensation optimization protocol.
With Brendon’s help, I implemented the motorized stage control software, the alignment
control sequence and time-tag mode synchronization, thereby integrating the automated
polarization alignment procedure into the QKD software.
3.5.1 Overview
As discussed in section 1.2 our QKD scheme employs photon polarization to encode quan-
tum information. A practical problem arises from the fact that the quantum source (sec-
tion 2.2) and receiver (section 2.3) do not necessarily share the same polarization reference
frame. Earth’s atmosphere itself is not birefringent [75, 76] (i.e. it does not substantially
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Investigate a straightforward protocol. Characterize then compensate:
Characterize and compensate
This simplest approach requires compensation at the receiver. (We will see 





Figure 3.6: Schematic of the automated polarization alignment procedure. The source
produces known polarizati n stat s which are th n ubject to an unknown rotation. The
rotation is characterized through measurements of the received photons. Appropriate com-
pensation is then applied to correctly align the polarization reference frames of the source
and the receiver.
modify photon polarization), however the many optical fibers which are used to guide light
throughout the source can significantly alter photon polarization. Moreover, fiber bire-
fringence is affected by temperature [77], so any change in the lab temperature ultimately
affects the alignment between the source and the receiver. Thus, continuous operation of
the experiment necessitates regular “tuning” of the alignment.
To resolve this problem, we have developed an automated procedure to characterize
and compensate the relative rotation between the two polarization reference frames, as
depicted in figure 3.6. Unlike other implementations which employ an independent strong
laser signal [78], our protocol relies solely on the photon detection statistics of the known
sequence of states prepared by the modulator (as described in section 2.2).
3.5.2 Characterization
The characterization step essentially reduces to quantum state tomography of photon po-
larization qubits [79], a common tool in experimental quantum mechanics and quantum
information processing. Our goal is to best estimate the unitary operator corresponding
to the unknown polarization rotation. The unknown rotation can be represented as an
arbitrary SU(2) unitary U of the form:
U =
[
eiα cos θ eiβ sin θ
−e−iβ sin θ e−iα cos θ
]
(3.4)
If the input polarization state (in density operator form) is ρ, then the state produced by
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the action of the unknown rotation is given by
ρ′ = UρU † (3.5)
As discussed in section 2.2, the source prepares a sequence of known polarization states,
so we have full knowledge of ρ. The idea is to perform measurements on ρ′ in order to
estimate the real-valued angles α, β, and θ which fully describe U . This approximation
is accomplished with maximum likelihood estimation on measurement statistics from an
overcomplete set of outcomes: horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D, +45◦ from hor-
izontal), anti-diagonal (A, −45◦ from horizontal), right-circular (R), and left-circular (L)
polarizations.
3.5.3 Compensation
Once the unitary is characterized, a set of compensation optics (see section 3.5.4) is used to
implement the inverse of the unitary, thereby canceling out the relative rotation. Similar
to the unknown polarization rotation U , the compensation operation can be represented as
an SU(2) unitary operator, C. Taking into account the action of C, the measured photon
polarization state becomes
ρ′ = CUρU †C† (3.6)
Hence, we want to find C which satisfies CU ≈ I, the identity rotation. If this condition
is met, the output state ρ′ will closely approximate the original input state ρ.
3.5.4 Experimental Implementation
To implement this two-step protocol experimentally, we need to
• Perform measurements in the circular basis, as required for the characterization step
(section 3.5.2). This functionality is not readily provided by the polarization analysis
module in the quantum receiver (section 2.3).
• Compensate for any given polarization rotation, as required for the compensation
step (section 3.5.3).
Both of the above requirements can be fulfilled by a small set of wave plates. In particular,
we employ a sequence of quarter-wave plate (QWP), half-wave plate (HWP), and QWP.
As shown in figure 2.5, the wave plate triplet is placed in motorized rotation stages and
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located at the quantum receiver, just prior to the measurement. This triplet can implement
an arbitrary polarization rotation and can also be used to achieve a change-of-basis for
measuring circular polarizations.
With this setup, the characterization process is done in two stages: linear polarization
measurements are taken first, followed by measurements in the circular basis. The com-
pensation operation C is fully determined by the rotation angles of the three wave plates:
φ1, φ2, φ3. We estimate the angles with an optimizing search over a range of values for φ1,
φ2, φ3, where we maximize the fidelity between ρ and ρ
′. The alignment optimizer is imple-
mented as a stand-alone executable written in C. The QKD software invokes this analysis
program, providing measurement statistics, and obtaining optimal wave plate angles.
To preserve the correct binning of measurement outcomes, we designed a simple set of
modes which Bob applies as special bit-masks to each time-tag. Alice then interprets the
bit-masks and displays the measurement statistics accordingly. Those time-tag modes are:
• QKD mode: the standard operation mode of the experiment.
• POLN LINEAR mode: polarization alignment in progress, measurements of linear
polarizations.
• POLN CIRCULAR mode: polarization alignment in progress, measurements of cir-
cular polarizations.
Below is the full alignment control sequence from Alice’s point of view. She is the one
in control of the protocol, while Bob is programmed to simply follow her commands.
1. Turn the wave plates to their calibrated optic axis positions, in order to measure
linear polarizations.
2. Send a message telling Bob that the experiment is in POLN LINEAR mode.
3. Wait until the CoincidenceTask collects enough data in this mode.
4. Turn the wave plates for measurement of circular polarizations. This is accomplished
by rotating the second QWP by 45◦.
5. Send a message telling Bob that the experiment is in POLN CIRCULAR mode.
6. Wait until the CoincidenceTask collects enough data in this mode. When done, go
back to QKD mode
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7. All the counts are summed up and the stand-alone optimizer is invoked. If the
optimizer succeeds, set the wave plates to their optimal values; otherwise, revert to
their original values.
8. Send a message telling Bob that the experiment is back to the regular QKD mode.
It is also important to exclude detection events recorded while the wave-plates are
rotating. For this purpose, the stage control task at Bob sends messages to the data
acquisition task telling it when the wave-plates started and stopped moving, and a special
INVALID mask is applied to the time-tags during rotation.
Note that only the measurement and motorized stage rotation is performed at the
receiver end. Bob only has to transmit his measurement statistics (which reduce to a 24
32-bit integers) to Alice on the ground. There, it is processed as outlined above and the
compensation settings (φ1, φ2, φ3) are transmitted back to the receiver.
Integrating this automated alignment procedure into the QKD software has significantly
improved our ability to achieve low QBER at various loss regimes. Manual alignment is
close to impossible at high loss due to the low SNR and high sensitivity to background
light. Furthermore, some form of automated polarization alignment will be crucial in
future experiments with moving receiver (eventually on a satellite), since in those cases,
the orientation of the reference frames as well as the loss in the quantum channel will be
varying with time.
3.6 Error Correction
The next step in the QKD post-processing protocol (section 3.2) is error correction. The
broad topic of coding theory is a field in itself and has been studied extensively, especially
in the classical world. This section provides a brief overview of error correction in QKD
and focuses on our specific implementation employing low-density parity-check (LDPC)
codes. We found that LDPC codes are very suitable for satellite-based QKD due to low
communication overhead and the inherent asymmetry in the amount of processing required
at each side.
3.6.1 Overview
After transmission of quantum signals over the free-space quantum channel, Alice and
Bob establish their respective raw keys. Those keys are not identical as they contain
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𝑌 = 𝑋 ⊕ 𝑁 𝑋 ∈ 𝔽2
𝑛 





1 − 𝑞 
𝑞 
𝑞 
1 − 𝑞 
Figure 3.7: Schematic representations of the binary symmetric channel (BSC). The noise
vectorN follows a Bernoulli(1−q, q) distribution. As shown on the right, q is the probability
of a bit-flip error, i.e. the crossover probability. In our error correction model, Bob on the
satellite is assumed to have the error-free sifted key X, while Alice on the ground holds
the “noisy” sifted key Y which needs to be corrected to match X (based on some limited
information about X).
several types of errors. Intrinsic errors due to basis mismatch are eliminated by the sifting
procedure which in our implementation is incorporated into the coincidence algorithm
(section 3.4). Without the presence of an eavesdropper, the remaining errors are caused by
the unavoidable imperfections in the physical realization of the quantum source, channel
and measurement. Some examples of these are:
• Imperfections in the state preparation procedure at the source (section 2.2). Small
fluctuations in the laser spectra and modulator voltage settings as well as room
temperature variations cause the source to sometimes produce incorrect states.
• Polarization reference frame misalignment is only approximately corrected with the
automated polarization algorithm (section 3.5).
• At the receiver, imperfect polarizing beam splitters, detector dark counts and stray
background light can lead to accidental coincidences.
An eavesdropper can also cause discrepancies in the key, however, Alice and Bob have
no way of distinguishing between different error sources. For security reasons, they must
assume that all key disparities are due to eavesdropping. Note that in order to compensate
for key errors, it is not necessary to perform quantum error correction [80, 81], even though
such a scheme (albeit impractical in this case) could potentially be implemented. Alter-
natively, the communication channel1 is modelled as a classical binary symmetric channel
1Here, the term communication channel does not refer to the physical medium for information trans-
mission, but rather to the information theoretic statistical model consisting of input, {x}, and output,
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(BSC) [82] with crossover probability q = QBER as shown in figure 3.7. An important
difference from classical coding theory is that the transmitter does not encode informa-
tion in “codewords” which (in a classical scenario) are typically transmitted over the noisy
channel and decoded at the receiver. Instead, we assume that Bob (the receiver) already
holds a “correct” version of the key, while Alice (the transmitter) attempts to reconcile her
key. During this key reconciliation process, partial information about Bob’s key is revealed
over the classical channel.
Nevertheless, Shannon’s channel coding theorem [83], also known as the noisy-channel
coding theorem, still applies in this context. It sets a fundamental upper bound on the key
rate as well as a lower bound on the amount of information (about Bob’s key) which needs
to be disclosed in order to correct the key. Error correcting codes are generally ranked
based on their efficiency, denoted ηEC(q), which specifies how well they perform relative to
the channel capacity, C = maxp(x) I(X : Y ). For example, a value of ηEC(q) = 1 indicates
that the code can achieve the optimal key rate (i.e. the code operates at capacity), while
ηEC(q) > 1 implies that the code rate is below the Shannon limit and additional information
needs to be leaked out to successfully correct the key. Shannon’s coding theorem also tells
us that a value of ηEC(q) < 1 is unfeasible. Apart from their efficiency, error correcting
codes are also evaluated based on their classical communication requirements (which is
generally related to their interactivity) and their computational complexity for each party.
The most common error correction algorithm employed in QKD until recently has been
the Cascade protocol. It is first proposed in an early form in [84] and fully developed by
Brassard and Salvail [85]. Further optimizations are explored in [86, 87]. Cascade is an
iterative, interactive reconciliation protocol. At each round, Alice and Bob divide up their
sifted key into blocks (the choice of block length has been the main area of optimization).
They proceed to compute and communicate their block parities. In the case of a parity
mismatch—implying an odd number of errors—they recursively perform binary search on
smaller and smaller blocks to locate one error, all along exchanging parities over the classical
channel. With that error corrected, subsequent rounds may uncover further disparities.
This cascading search is the underlying reason for the Cascade name. The number of
iterations is chosen in such a way as to keep the probability of residual errors below a small
threshold [85]; a number of rounds under 20 is usually sufficient.
The optimized Cascade protocol has an acceptable efficiency in the range (1.14, 1.22],
dependent on the QBER [88]. However, it suffers from several other shortcomings which
make it impractical for long-distance links with limited classical communication capabili-
ties, as is the case with satellite-based QKD. As mentioned, Cascade is very interactive,
{y}, alphabets and a transition probability matrix p(y|x) for each element of the two.
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so its real-world performance is strongly dependent on the latency of the classical channel.
To make matters worse, the number of required interactions increases with the QBER and
so does ηEC(q) as seen in figure 4 in [88]. Furthermore, Cascade is a symmetric procedure,
i.e. both parties go through the same steps, so it requires equal amount of data processing
resources at each end. This symmetry is not an obstacle in ground implementations, but
may be problematic for satellite links.
In an effort to do away with some disadvantages of Cascade, Buttler et al. [89] proposed
Winnow—a different reconciliation algorithm which attempts to apply techniques from
coding theory in the context of QKD. Winnow is significantly less interactive than Cascade
as it eliminates the binary search step. Similarly to Cascade, both parties divide their key
into blocks and exchange the parities. In the case of a parity mismatch, instead of binary
search, Alice and Bob compute Hamming’s syndromes [82] which are used to identify
the location of an error within a block. Some optimizations relating to the block length
choice are discussed in [90]. Even though Winnow eases the bandwidth requirement for
the classical channel, it suffers from worse efficiency ηEC(q) compared to Cascade.
More recently, QKD commercialization has led to increasingly higher key rates and a
pursuit for faster and more efficient error correction. A powerful tool in the modern coding
theory toolbox, forward error correcting codes, such as LDPC codes, have been adapted for
use in QKD with great success. Good codes have been obtained which perform very close
to the Shannon limit [88, 91] with ηEC(q) < 1.1, taking full advantage of the advancements
in the broader field. LDPC codes, discussed in detail in the next section, also turn out
to be well suited for satellite links because of their low communication overhead and the
ability to perform most of the processing at one side of the channel.
Author Contributions
I designed and implemented our LDPC-based error correction protocol based on published
research by Elkouss [88, 91, 92], Martinez-Mateo [93–95], Pearson et al. [71, 96] and many
other unpublished LDPC resources publicly available on the Internet. I modified Hu et
al.’s open-source Progressive-Edge Growth (PEG) software [97, 98] and employed it for
parity-check matrix construction. I significantly enhanced and optimized the C# decoder
developed by Chris Erven [99], which was in turn based on the Matlab code provided by
Philip Chan in his Masters thesis [100].
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3.6.2 Low-Density Parity-Check Codes
Low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes were first proposed fifty years ago by Gallager [101]
but did not gain traction due to the limited hardware capabilities at the time. It was
not until MacKay and Neal [70] rediscovered them in 1997 that LDPC codes became
more popular. They have recently been widely adopted for classical communication and
optimized for a variety of classical channels. This increased interest was due to MacKay
and Neal [70] showing that LDPC codes are in fact capacity-approaching, i.e. they can
perform close to the Shannon limit, similar to the much more complex turbo codes invented
in 1993 by Berrou et al. [102].
In the context of QKD, LDPC codes were first introduced by Pearson et al. [71, 96]
at BBN Technologies as part of the DARPA network, where Cascade proved to be very
impractical over long distances with high key rates. Other QKD experiments [10, 72]
and commercial implementations [24, 25, 103] have followed suit. Recent work by Elk-
ouss [88, 91, 92] and Martinez-Mateo [93–95] has dramatically improved the codes’ achiev-
able efficiency, reported in [88] to be as low as ηEC ≈ 1.02 (only 2% from the Shannon
limit) for some QBER values.
As implied by their name, LDPC codes are linear2 block codes which are fully specified
by a low-density, binary M ×N parity-check matrix H with entries
Hij ∈ F2 = {0, 1}. (3.7)
The sparse parity-check matrix H is used to compute an M -bit syndrome
s = Hx (mod 2) (3.8)
where x is Bob’s N -bit sifted key (column) vector. Each syndrome bit si contains parity
information from the corresponding parity-check equation (see section 3.6.4) defined by
the ith row of H.
The LDPC error correction protocol employed in our high-loss QKD experiment is
comprised of the following steps:
1. Alice at the “ground station” prepares a parity-check matrix H as discussed in sec-
tion 3.6.3. She then transmits H in a compact form to Bob over the classical channel.
2. For each block in his sifted key, Bob on the “satellite” efficiently computes an array
of syndromes (section 3.6.4) and streams it down to Alice.
2In classical coding theory, a binary block code C(n, k) with block length n, dimension k and size
|C| = 2k is linear if C is a k-dimensional subspace of the n-dimensional binary vector space (F2)n, i.e.
C(n, k) ⊆ (F2)n.
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3. Alice attempts to reconcile her sifted key assuming that Bob’s sifted key is “correct”.
For each N -bit block of sifted key, Alice’s goal is to resolve Bob’s key vector x, based
on her key vector y, Bob’s syndrome s, the parity-check matrix H, and the QBER
estimate from the coincidence analysis step (section 3.4). To accomplish this task,
Alice employs a procedure known as belief propagation—an iterative message passing
decoding algorithm which is described in section 3.6.3.
All of the above steps are integrated into the QKD software (section 3.3), however, due
to the limited capabilities of the computer used at Alice, the error correction procedure
is done offline (i.e. not in real time). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that, in the
context of QKD, we assume that all communication performed over the classical channel is
error-free. Hence, the classical channel implementation (e.g. an RF link) must guarantee
that this condition is met by possibly employing standard classical error correcting codes.
3.6.3 Ground-Side Processing
Following our architectural principle of offloading hard computations to the ground station
server, we have assigned Alice the tasks of constructing an LDPC matrix and syndrome
decoding. Those are both computationally expensive tasks which are fortunately quite
suitable for parallelization and hardware acceleration.
Parity-Check Matrix Design
As mentioned, an LDPC code is described by a parity-check matrix H. As depicted in
figure 3.8, H can be conveniently visualized with a Tanner [104] graph, an undirected
bipartite graph in which each edge connects a key node3 kj (representing a bit in the sifted
key) with a check node ci representing a set of bits from the key used in the corresponding











and H is as given in figure 3.8. Then, the parity-check equations producing the 4-bit
syndrome s are
3The key nodes are also commonly referred to as “message”, “bit” or “symbol” nodes in the literature.
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𝐻 =
0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 1
 
check nodes 
parity-check matrix key nodes 
Figure 3.8: Tanner graph representation of a parity-check matrix H. A key node (gray
circle) represents a bit in the sifted key block vector. A check node (square) is connected
to all key nodes involved in a given parity-check equation (corresponding to a row of H).
The number of ones in H is equal to the number of edges in the graph.
s1 = x2 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 (3.10)
s2 = x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 (3.11)
s3 = x1 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x6 (3.12)
s4 = x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 (3.13)
where ⊕ signifies addition modulo 2 (equivalent to the binary XOR operation). Thus, we
can easily observe that the number of edges in the Tanner graph corresponds to the number
of non-zero entries in H.
The degrees (i.e. the number of incident edges) of the vertices in the graph determine
the degree distribution of the code. If the degrees of all key and check nodes are respectively
constant, i.e. deg(kj) = dk and deg(ci) = dc for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then
the code is (dk, dc)–regular, and hence there are dk ones in each column and dc ones in
each row of H. The parameters dk and dc are commonly referred to as the column weight
and the row weight of H respectively. Randomly generated, regular LDPC codes were
the first studied [70], however, irregular ones with carefully selected non-constant degree
distributions have been shown to have better performance [105].
A family of irregular LDPC codes is generally specified with two generating polynomi-
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ρi = 1 (3.15)
where 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1 is the fraction of edges (in the Tanner graph) incident to key nodes
of degree j, and 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1 is the corresponding fraction for check nodes. Also, dmaxk =
maxj{deg(kj)} and dmaxc = maxi{deg(ci)} are respectively the maximum key and check
node degrees.
In the context of QKD, the rate of the code is equal to the ratio of unrevealed key bits
to the total number of bits per block. There are M rows in H, which correspond to M
parity-check equations. Hence, a total of M sifted key bits are revealed per block and the





The coding rate of a family of LDPC codes can also be expressed in terms of the corre-






More importantly, for the case of our channel model (figure 3.7), the rate is closely related





where H(q) is the binary Shannon entropy
H(q) = −q log2 q − (1− q) log2(1− q) (3.19)
Good LDPC code families for the BSC are published in [91, 95, 105], where the authors
employ genetic algorithms called density evolution [106] and differential evolution to search
for optimal degree distributions. Table 3.2 presents a subset of these distributions (with
slight modifications) at various code rates which are used in our experiment. According
to table 3.2 and equation (3.18), codes can be selected based on how closely their rate
corresponds to the QBER estimate for a predefined efficiency value.
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Rate λ(x)
0.40 0.18175x+ 0.14733x2 + 0.05443x3 + 0.07073x4 + 0.06869x6 + 0.13514x8
+ 0.15958x34 + 0.18235x39
0.50 0.15967x+ 0.12187x2 + 0.11261x3 + 0.19087x4 + 0.07706x9 + 0.33792x24
0.55 0.16880x+ 0.20994x2 + 0.18095x5 + 0.03846x14 + 0.02635x15 + 0.23454x17
+ 0.05815x18 + 0.08280x30
0.60 0.11653x+ 0.12565x2 + 0.10851x3 + 0.05342x4 + 0.07272x6 + 0.03479x7
+ 0.07299x8 + 0.07526x17 + 0.11712x31 + 0.22301x44
0.65 0.10451x+ 0.15652x2 + 0.08057x3 + 0.00056x4 + 0.12151x8 + 0.10485x12
+ 0.10719x14 + 0.00771x20 + 0.31656x50
0.70 0.09169x+ 0.17141x2 + 0.06839x3 + 0.12052x4 + 0.18747x10 + 0.20828x27
+ 0.15224x29
0.80 0.09420x+ 0.18088x2 + 0.11972x5 + 0.08550x6 + 0.09816x7 + 0.07194x16
+ 0.34960x25
0.90 0.07689x+ 0.28096x2 + 0.08933x4 + 0.19620x6 + 0.30631x7 + 0.05031x11
Table 3.2: Generating polynomials corresponding to optimized degree distributions for
different code rates, slightly modified from [91, 95].
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A major challenge for satellite-based QKD is the limited length of the sifted key pro-
duced over a single satellite pass [18]. Finite-size effects [19] aside, this limitation restricts
the efficiency of LDPC codes since most optimization schemes assume infinite block lengths.
As seen in chapter 5 and [18], the achievable sifted key length over a single satellite pass is
around 20, 000 to 100, 000 bits, while good efficiencies have been reported for block sizes
in the order of 106 [91]. Large block sizes are beneficial because the sum-product decoding
algorithm (discussed later on) operates optimally over Tanner graphs without any cycles;
as the block length is finite, this condition is impossible to satisfy. Intuitively, the length
of the smallest cycle in the Tanner graph, i.e. the girth of the graph, should be as large as
possible [95].
Progressive Edge-Growth Matrix Construction
For small block sizes, randomly constructed parity-check matrices have a much greater
chance of containing many small cycles in their Tanner graphs. To solve this problem, Hu
et al. [97, 107] proposed an efficient construction procedure—the progressive edge-growth
(PEG) algorithm—which takes a combinatorial approach to produce large-girth Tanner
graphs. As its name suggests, the PEG algorithm progressively (i.e. edge-by-edge) creates
edges between key and check nodes [97]. PEG is a greedy algorithm in the sense that each
step aims to maximize the local girth of the subgraph containing the currently considered
key node. However, in [97], Hu et al. also outline a non-greedy version of the algorithm in
which a desired target girth value for the resulting Tanner graph can be specified.
The PEG algorithm takes as inputs the block size n (i.e. the number of key nodes) and
the key node degree distribution λ(x) given by equation (3.14), such as the distributions
found in table 3.2, to produce a key-node-degree sequence. The algorithm then repeats the
following two steps until the desired number of edges have been created [95, 97]:
1. Subgraph Expansion: Starting from a key node kj, the subgraph is expanded such
that the key node is connected to the most distant check node. Check nodes produc-
ing short cycles are detected and avoided, and a set N lkj of candidate check nodes
producing long cycles is created. N lkj is the set of check nodes reachable from the
key node kj after subgraph expansion up to depth l.
2. Edge-Selection: Update N lkj according to the key-node-degree sequence and by se-
lecting candidate check nodes with the lowest degree.
An improved version of this algorithm is presented in [94] where the check node degree
distribution ρ(x) given by equation (3.14) is also taken into account.
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Our QKD software incorporates a modified version of Hu et al.’s open-source PEG
parity-check matrix construction software [97, 98] employing the optimal degree distribu-
tion profiles shown in table 3.2. The PEG construction has significantly improved the
performance of our LDPC codes with moderate block lengths around 30, 000 to 50, 000
bits. However, for block sizes under 30, 000, a major difficulty becomes to produce ma-
trices corresponding to Tanner graphs without cycles of length four; yet, still satisfying
the desired degree distribution profiles as given in table 3.2. Intuitively, as the size of the
parity-check matrix is increased, the degree distribution profile constraints become easier
to satisfy, because the required number of edges grows linearly with the block size, while
the total number of entries in H grows quadratically.
Belief Propagation Decoding
Recall that according to the protocol described in section 3.6.2, after Alice has produced
a PEG-generated parity check matrix, H, and Bob has computed and sent down his syn-
drome, s, Alice needs to reconcile her key, y, so that it matches Bob’s key, x. The
reconciliation is accomplished with a syndrome decoding algorithm which takes H, s and
y as inputs and, when successful, produces an estimate, x̂, of Bob’s key.
The most straightforward way to proceed is to use maximum-likelihood decoding, where
the decoder aims to maximize Pr(X = x̂|Y = y) and hence the probability that x̂ = x
(see figure 3.7). Unfortunately, given our channel model, there is no known efficient (i.e.
polynomial-time) algorithm to accomplish this task. In fact, general maximum-likelihood
decoding is an NP-complete problem for the BSC [95, 108].
Alternatively, Gallager [101] suggests the use of message-passing decoding algorithms
which have been shown to work efficiently when the codes have sparse parity-check matri-
ces. Message-passing algorithms are iterative algorithms in which messages are propagated
between key and check nodes (and vice versa) along the edges of the Tanner graph. When
the messages contain probabilities (or beliefs), the technique is called belief propagation [95].
For LDPC decoding, the most common belief propagation implementation is known as the
sum-product algorithm, described in detail in [70]. In the context of QKD, Pearson [71]
proposed a small change to this algorithm in order to impose additional parity constraints.
A review of the sum-product decoding algorithm for QKD is presented below following
notation similar to [70, 100] and [95].
Define the following index sets:
Ni = {j | H(i, j) = 1}, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (3.20)
Mj = {i | H(i, j) = 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} (3.21)
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Hence, Ni indicates which bits from Bob’s sifted key vector x participate in the ith parity-
check equation, as determined by the non-zero entries in the ith row of H. Conversely,
Mj specifies which parity-check equations incorporate the key bit xj, as determined by
the non-zero entries in the jth column of H.
Let p0 and p1 be initial (a priori) probability vectors such that
ptj = Pr(xj = t|yj), t ∈ {0, 1} (3.22)
and observe that
p1j = 1− p0j (3.23)
Similarly, q0 and q1 are the final (pseudo-posterior) probability vectors produced by the
decoding algorithm.
Furthermore, Q0 and Q1 are two matrices storing the messages going from key to check
nodes. Each message Qtij (t ∈ {0, 1}) contains the probability that xj = t based on the
information from the parity-check equations in Mj\{i}. Correspondingly, the matrices
R0 and R1 store the messages passed in the opposite direction—from check nodes to key
nodes. Each message Rtij (t ∈ {0, 1}) contains the probability that the ith parity-check
equation is satisfied given that xj = t is fixed and the probability distribution
{Qtij′ | j′ ∈ Ni\{j}} (3.24)
for the remaining key bits is separable [70].
The sum-product algorithm has an initialization stage followed by two sequential message-
passing steps, which are executed iteratively until successful decoding or until a predefined
number of iterations has been reached.
1. Initialization: Suppose the initial QBER estimate is q, then p0 and p1 are initialized
as
∀t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ptj =
 1− q if yj = t
q if yj 6= t
(3.25)
Also, the initial messages from key to check nodes are set to
∀t ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀i ∈Mj, Qtij = ptj (3.26)
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2. Horizontal step: The decoder calculates the probability messages going from check
to key nodes. Let
Qδ = Q0 −Q1 (3.27)
then the following probabilities are computed:












where Rδ is a sparse matrix storing intermediate results, and si is the i
th bit in Bob’s
syndrome, s. In equation (3.28) the sign of Rδij is changed whenever si = 1. This is
the modification for QKD suggested by Pearson [71].
3. Vertical step: The decoder calculates the probability messages going from key to
check nodes as follows:




Next, the pseudo-posterior probability vectors are computed:




where αij and αj are normalization factors which are added to ensure that
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ∀i ∈Mj, Q0ij +Q1ij = 1 (3.33)
and
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, q0j + q1j = 1 (3.34)
4. Termination Condition: Based on the pseudo-posterior probabilities obtained in
equation (3.32), the estimate, x̂, of Bob’s key is subsequently updated:
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, x̂j =





0 if q1j ≤ 12
(3.35)
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The algorithm terminates with SUCCESS if Alice’s syndrome matches the syndrome
obtained from the estimate x̂, i.e. when
Hy = Hx̂ (3.36)
If the maximum number of iterations has been reached and the above condition is
not satisfied, the algorithm terminates with FAILURE. Otherwise, a new iteration
begins at the horizontal step.
Note that it is not necessary to store H itself as the index sets Ni and Mj al-
ready contain the full information given by the parity-check matrix. The six matrices
Q0, Q1, Qδ, R0, R1, Rδ are sparse (with non-zero entries in the same locations as H), and
Ni,Mj indicate the positions of the non-zero entries across all of them.
In our QKD software, the sum-product decoder can be run in parallel on multiple
blocks of sifted key, in a way similar to the coincidence algorithm (section 3.4.1). The
computational complexity per block scales linearly with the block length, because H is
sparse and the row weights are kept under a small constant value (usually less than 50).
3.6.4 Satellite-Side Processing
On the satellite, the required computation is minimal—as desired. All Bob needs to do is
compute his syndromes after obtaining H from Alice on the ground. This operation can
be accomplished with a simple matrix multiplication:
s = Hx (mod 2) (3.37)
However, this computation does not take advantage of the sparseness of H.
There is a more efficient way to calculate the syndrome if H is stored in the adjacency
list format. The procedure is presented in algorithm 3.3. Since the row weights of H
never exceed a small constant value, the innermost foreach loop in algorithm 3.3 executes
a bounded number of iterations. Thus, the computational complexity per block scales
linearly with the block size.
Another benefit of this approach is that Alice does not need to transmit the full matrix
H to the satellite. Following the notation from the previous section, Alice effectively sends
Bob only the N index sets Mj containing the non-zero entries in each column j of H.
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Algorithm 3.3: Efficient syndrome computation
Data: A binary parity-check matrix H represented in the adjacency list format, a
binary vector x storing a block of sifted key
Result: A binary vector containing the syndrome s = Hx
/* Initialize s to a 0-filled vector */
1 s = 0
/* adjList[j] holds a list of indices i for which H[i, j] = 1 */
2 for j = 1 to x.length do
3 if x[j] == 1 then
4 foreach index i in adjList[j] do






If the information reconciliation step described in section 3.6 terminates successfully, Alice
and Bob share the error-corrected key
kEC = x̂ = x (3.38)
However, kEC is only partially secure, since some information might have been leaked out
to the eavesdropper, Eve, either during the quantum signal exchange (as evidenced by the
QBER which we must attribute to Eve) or during error correction, where we assume that
all parity information is known to Eve.
A procedure known as privacy amplification [109–111] is employed to reduce Eve’s
partial information about kEC. As depicted in figure 3.9, privacy amplification consists
of applying a compression function f to the partially-secure, error-corrected key kEC to
produce a provably secure key kF of length L < N , where N is the key block size. The
length L of the final secure key is the subject of study of QKD security proofs [19, 64,
112, 113] as discussed in section 1.2. Due to finite-size effects, N needs to be kept above
a certain value (usually on the order of 105) and that has to be taken into account when
selecting a hash function.
Privacy amplification is unfortunately a symmetric procedure which needs to be per-

















Figure 3.9: Privacy amplification in general. After the error correction step, Alice and Bob
randomly choose a common compression function f , which is applied to the reconciled key
kEC to produce the final secure key kF of length L < N .
3.7.1 Two-Universal Hash Functions
There are several considerations when selecting the hash function
f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}L (3.39)
Firstly, f needs to be chosen such that Eve’s information about kF is reduced below some
infinitesimal value. In Shor-Preskill’s[64, 112] and Scarani-Renner’s[19, 113] formalisms,
the key can be secured by a special family of functions called two-universal hash func-
tions [1, 114].
Definition 1. A family of functions
F = {fr | r ∈ N, fr : A→ B}
is two-universal if
Pr{fr(x) = fr(x̂)} ≤
1
|B|
, ∀ x 6= x̂ ∈ A
Two-universal hash functions are used for privacy amplification in the following way:
1. After the information reconciliation step, Alice and Bob share the error-corrected
key kEC and Eve has an estimate k̂EC.
2. Alice and Bob choose f from the two-universal set and communicate it publicly.
They then share a shorter final key kF = f(kEC).
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3. Eve’s estimate k̂F = f(k̂EC), has a very low probability of coinciding with kF, since
by two-universality (definition 1),




Thus, Eve has the same chances of obtaining the key as if she chose randomly from
the set {0, 1}L of all potential final keys [1].
Note that f must be chosen randomly with uniform probability from the set of two-universal
hash functions after the measurement, so that Eve cannot adapt her eavesdropping strat-
egy.
3.7.2 LFSR Implementation
When QKD post-processing is done with limited resources, major considerations for the
choice of hash function are the computational complexity and the amount of classical com-
munication required. In our QKD implementation, the privacy amplification procedure
roughly follows the methodology outlined in [114], however, we made some modifications
to their model (which had some inaccuracies) and developed a different matrix multiplica-
tion procedure presented in algorithm 3.4. In brief, we employ the Toeplitz matrix [115]
construction implemented efficiently with a linear feedback shift register (LFSR).
Definition 2. A diagonal-constant matrix or Toeplitz matrix is a matrix which has




rL rL+1 . . . . . . . . . . . . rN+L−2 rN+L−1
rL−1 rL
. . . . . . rN+L−3 rN+L−2
... rL−1





. . . rL rL+1 rN−2
r1 r2 . . . rL−1 rL rL+1 . . . . . . rN−1

L×N
In [73], Krawczyk shows that Toeplitz matrices are in fact two-universal hash functions.
Note that the Toeplitz matrix Tr above is completely defined by the (N +L−1)-bit vector
r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN+L−1) (3.41)
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so there is no need to store Tr or to transmit the entire matrix over the classical channel.
Thus, these matrices are very suitable for privacy amplification.
A simplification to the construction in definition 2 is proposed by Hayashi et al. [116,
117]. It has been shown that a matrix of the following form
Hr = (IL|Tr) =





. . . . . . rN−3 rN−2
... 0
. . . 0
...
... rL−1




. . . 1 0 r2
...
. . . rL rL+1 rN−L−1
0 . . . . . . 0 1 r1 r2 . . . rL−1 rL rL+1 . . . . . . rN−L

(3.42)
i.e. a concatenation of an identity matrix IL and a Toeplitz matrix Tr, is also two-universal,
however, it requires only N − 1 bits to define.
Using the streamlined Toeplitz construction from equation (3.42), we have implemented
the following privacy amplification protocol:
1. After the information reconciliation step, Alice generates a random binary string
r = (r1, r2, . . . , rN−1) (3.43)
of length N − 1.
2. Alice transmits r over the classical channel to Bob.
3. Alice and Bob use r and an LFSR to compute the final secure key
kF = Hr kEC (3.44)
as described in figure 3.10 and algorithm 3.4.
Note that step 3 involves the same amount of computation on the satellite as on the
ground, and hence, it could potentially create a bottleneck on the satellite. Fortunately,
the matrix multiplication in equation (3.44) can be implemented with efficient bitwise
operations and an LFSR. Figure 3.10 depicts our implementation graphically. The full
procedure is given in algorithm 3.4.
60
Algorithm 3.4: LFSR-based privacy amplification
Data: Error-corrected key vector kEC, (N − 1)-bit random binary string r. Both
stored in 32-bit unsigned integer arrays. The final key length L.
Result: Final key vector kF = Hr kEC
1 temp = 0, kF = 0
2 numLFSRUnits = (N-L)/32
3 for i = 1 to numLFSRUnits do
4 lfsr[i] = r[L/32 + i]
5 temp = temp + LookupBitCount ( lfsr[i] AND kEC[L/32 + i] )
6 end
7 if ( 1 AND kEC[1] ) 6= 0 then
8 temp = temp + 1
9 end
10 if ( temp MOD 2 ) 6= 0 then
11 kF[1] = 1
12 end
13 for i = 2 to numLFSRUnits do
14 temp = 0
15 sbit = GetNextInputBit (r)
16 for j = 1 to numLFSRUnits do
17 fbit = 0
18 if ( lfsr[j] AND 0×80000000 ) 6= 0 then
19 fbit = 1
20 end
21 lfsr[j] = lfsr[j] LSHIFT 1
22 lfsr[j] = lfsr[j] OR sbit
23 sbit = fbit
24 temp = temp + LookupBitCount ( lfsr[j] AND kEC[L/32 + j] )
25 end
26 if ( (1 LSHIFT (i MOD 32)) AND kEC[i] ) 6= 0 then
27 temp = temp + 1
28 end
29 if ( temp MOD 2 ) 6= 0 then





𝑟𝐿 𝑟𝐿+1 ⋯ 𝑟𝐿+31 𝑟𝑁−32 𝑟𝑁−31 ⋯ 𝑟𝑁−1 ⋯ 
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(𝑁 − 𝐿)-bit logical LFSR 








Figure 3.10: LFSR-based implementation of Toeplitz matrix multiplication.
Definition 3. A linear feedback shift register (LFSR) is a shift register in which the
input bit is a linear function of the register’s previous state.
The main idea behind our memory-constrained privacy-amplification implementation
is to never store full matrices. The identity portion of each row of Hr = (IL|Tr) takes up
no space and can be accounted for with a simple AND operation (see algorithm 3.4). We
represent the Toeplitz matrix Tr, which is embedded in Hr from equation (3.42), as an
(N − L)-bit logical LFSR. Initially, the LFSR contains the bit vector
rinit = (rL, rL+1, . . . , rN−1) (3.45)
and the remaining bits from r are used as input for the LFSR
rinput = (rN−L−1, rN−L−2, . . . , r1) (3.46)
Since (N − L) bits cannot fit in a single register, the logical LFSR is broken up into
multiple 32-bit LFSR blocks as illustrated in figure 3.10. Each block is designed to fit
inside a register on a processing unit. The register size of 32 is chosen because that number
is widely supported across multiple platforms including our low-power ARM test board.
64-bit platforms are also available, and with single instruction, multiple data (SIMD)
extensions, the register can be as large as 128 bits. The only drawback to using larger
registers is that the granularity is reduced, as the values of N and L need to be multiples
of the register size.
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After initialization, algorithm 3.4 computes each row of the multiplication Sr kEC by
performing a bitwise AND of each LFSR unit and the corresponding section of kEC, while
keeping track of the bit count (implemented with an efficient table lookup). Each row of
Sr produces a bit in the final key. For the next row, all LFSR units are shifted. The first
unit gets an input bit from rinput and all other units get a feedback bit from their leftmost
neighbor as shown in figure 3.10. The process continues until no more bits are left in rinput.




Tsurumaru [114] suggests a further optimization which can be applied, assuming that
both parties are able to quickly compute fast Fourier transforms (FFTs). It consists of
embedding the Toeplitz matrix Tr from definition 2 in a circulant matrix Cr and breaking
up the multiplication as described in [118]:
k
′
F = Cr k
′
EC (3.47)









EC is just kEC padded with zeros at the bottom to match the dimensions of Cr.
Similarly, the desired result of the computation, i.e. kF, is found in the top L bits of k
′
F.
In terms of complexity, this approach is faster as it runs in time Θ(N log2N). However,
it requires access to an FFT engine. FFT can be implemented without hardware acceler-
ation, but it still requires floating-point support, which was something we did not want to
assume. Hence, we stuck with the Θ(N2) algorithm which works well with smaller block




Important practical consideration for the implementation of a QKD receiver on a satellite
platform are the computational resource requirements of the satellite-side QKD protocol
as well as the communication bandwidth needed to accomplish all classical post-processing
steps. The software stack implementing the QKD protocol (chapter 3) is designed in such
a way that computing resource requirements and network bandwidth usage can be accu-
rately estimated. Estimates of the computing resources required onboard the satellite are
discussed in section 4.1. Classical communication requirements are provided in section 4.2
4.1 Satellite-Side Resources
Recall that in the proposed uplink scenario discussed in section 1.3, optical signals are sent
from the ground when the satellite orbits over an optical ground station, while classical
communication is performed (at a later time) when the satellite orbits over one or more RF
ground stations. Hence, the satellite system needs to store all time-tags accumulated during
the optical station flyover, and then perform all steps of the QKD protocol during an RF
station flyover (when a classical communication link is present). The estimates described
in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 assume that each flyover lasts approximately 5 minutes.
4.1.1 Memory Requirements
In terms of memory requirements, Bob must store: time-tags, measurement basis, photon
detections (stored as bit values), LDPC matrix, and the privacy amplification Toeplitz
matrix [115] which is efficiently implemented with a shift register [73]. Full details of our
protocol implementation are provided in chapter 3.
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Parameter Value Unit
Time-tag precision 78 picosec
Time register width 34 bit
Channel register width 3 bit
Total bits per time-tag 37 bit
Total with byte alignment 40 bit
Duration of measurement 300 sec
Maximum received average time-tag rate 100 kHz
Maximum total memory usage 150 Mbyte
Table 4.1: Memory requirements for time-tag storage.
Data Storage
The time-tagging hardware (see section 3.1) produces time-tags of size up to 64 bits.
However, to save memory (and classical communication traffic) it is possible to reduce that
number significantly, at the expense of additional computation steps. One simple scheme is
to store the full time-tag only at the beginning of every second of data collection, together
with additional information provided by the GPS receiver (which outputs a data packet
every second). The memory requirements for this scheme and supporting parameters are
provided in table 4.1.
Error Correction
Our one-way error correction scheme is based on low-density parity check (LDPC) codes
(see section 3.6). Its advantage is a significant reduction of computation steps on the
satellite and a reduction in classical communication. On the satellite side, an M by N
sparse parity check binary matrix needs to be stored. It is applied to parts of the key
(blocks of size N) to produce syndrome vectors of size M . Thus, the size of the matrix
varies based on the choice of block size N and the channel QBER, q. From Shannon’s
channel coding theorem [83] applied to the binary symmetric channel [82], we can deduce
a closed form estimate of the size of the LDPC matrix based on the QBER [88],
M = NηECH(q) (4.1)
Here, ηEC is the error correction efficiency and H is the binary entropy function.
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Parameter Value Unit
Sifted key rate 40 kHz
Sifted key buffer 1.5 Mbyte
Block size, N 40000 bit
Error correction efficiency, ηEC 1.2
QBER, q 0.07
Syndrome length, M 14296 bit
Maximum row weight, Wr 100
LDPC parity-check matrix 5.7 Mbyte
Total (maximum) memory usage 7.2 Mbyte
Table 4.2: Memory requirements for error correction. This memory usage can be signifi-
cantly reduced at the expense of worse error correction efficiency and hence lower final key
rate.
We can efficiently store the sparse parity check matrix in the adjacency list format
where only the indices of each non-zero element in each row are stored. There are at most
WrM such indices, and each index is stored in at most 32 bits. Sample numbers are shown
in table 4.2. Note that the block size N can be made significantly smaller at the expense
of possibly increasing the value of ηEC (i.e. by having worse error correction efficiency).
Privacy Amplification
In this final stage of the QKD protocol, Bob on the satellite receives a random binary string
of length equal to the length N of the sifted key. Then he uses an LFSR to implement a
Toeplitz matrix (as discussed in section 3.7) and applies it to his key. Due to the efficient
matrix implementation, at most N bits need to be stored per block. Thus, the total
memory usage based on the parameters indicated in table 4.2 would be 40 kbit.
Total Memory Requirements
Summarizing the estimates above, the total maximum memory required for QKD on the
satellite computer is about 157 Mbyte. Therefore, the recommended total system memory
should be at least 256 Mbyte. This number will ultimately depend also on the memory
requirement of the on-board operating system. Based on the survey in appendix A of state
of the art space-grade computing hardware, this memory requirement is well within our
current technological capabilities.
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Type of operation Asympt. number Estimate Estimated number of
of operations of constant operations per second
Comparison O(n) 5 500,000
memcpy O(n) 1 100,000
Logical AND/OR O(n) 2 200,000
Assignment O(n) 5 500,000
Addition/Subtraction O(n) 3 300,000
Total operations O(n) 16 1,600,000
Table 4.3: Worst-case computational requirements for time-tag processing, where n is the
raw key rate.
4.1.2 Computing Requirements
The current state of the satellite-side software (Bob) allows us to obtain estimates of the
number of operations required to perform QKD. The estimates are provided in terms of
asymptotic analysis of the underlying algorithms. Exact numbers in terms of clock cycles or
number of basic instructions per second will be highly dependent on the specific processing
architecture used for the onboard computer. Our implementation currently runs both on
a standard x86 desktop computer, and on a low-power embedded ARM platform.
Time-Tag Processing
The processing of time-tags is a linear algorithm, so it is only dependent on the total
number of detected time-tags. To estimate the number of operations per second, we assume
a raw key rate of 100 kHz. Worst-case estimates of the number of operations are given in
table 4.3.
Sifting
Sifting is also a linear process. It is dependent on the sifted key rate, which is assumed to
be at most 40 kHz. Worst-case estimates are shown in table 4.4.
Error Correction
The error correction algorithm (see section 3.6) on the satellite side consists of multiplying
a sparse binary matrix (the LDPC parity check matrix) by a binary vector (a block of
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Type of operation Asympt. number Estimate Estimated number of
of operations of constant operations per second
Comparison O(m) 4 160,000
Addition/Subtraction O(m) 3 120,000
Bit shift O(m) 1 40,000
Logical AND/OR O(m) 2 80,000
Assignment O(m) 5 200,000
Total operations O(m) 15 600,000
Table 4.4: Worst-case computational requirements for sifting, where m is the sifted key
rate.
Type of operation Asympt. number Estimate Estimated number of
of operations of constant operations per second
Comparison O(WrN) 100 4,000,000
Logical XOR O(WrN) 50 2,000,000
Assignment O(WrN) 50 2,000,000
Total operations O(WrN) 200 8,000,000
Table 4.5: Worst-case computational requirements for error correction. M ×N is the size
of the LDPC parity check matrix H. Wr < 100 is the maximum row weight of H.
sifted key). As discussed in section 4.1.1, the size of the matrix (M ×N) depends on the
QBER and the desired error correction efficiency according to equation (4.1). Assuming
parameter values as indicated in table 4.2 and the sparse-matrix multiplication procedure
described in algorithm 3.3, we obtain the computational estimates shown in table 4.5.
Privacy Amplification
Our privacy amplification implementation (section 3.7) is based on a hashing algorithm
with Toeplitz matrices [115] which is implemented with a shift register [73, 119]. The
hashing algorithm operates on the error corrected key of size N . The resulting final key
length L depends on several factors (QBER, error correction efficiency, sifted key length).
In practice, L < N
2
for our loss levels.
Using parameter values as in table 4.2, we obtain the privacy amplification estimates
in table 4.6.
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Type of operation Asympt. number Estimate Estimated number of
of operations of constant operations per second
Comparison O( (N − L)L ) 1/32 12,500,000
Addition O( (N − L)L ) 2/32 25,000,000
Bit shift O( (N − L)L ) 1/32 12,500,000
Logical AND/OR O( (N − L)L ) 3/32 37,500,000
Assignment O( (N − L)L ) 6/32 75,000,000
Total operations O( (N − L)L ) 13/32 162,500,000
Table 4.6: Worst-case computational requirements for privacy amplification (assuming a
32-bit computing architecture). N is the error-corrected key length, L is the final key size.
Total Computational Requirements
Based on the above estimates, the overall worst-case computational requirement of the
QKD protocol for the satellite receiver is approximately 173 million operations per second.
Different architectures/compilers might translate these operations into a different number
of basic processor instructions, but experience suggests that for these requirements to be
satisfied a clock speed of at least 750 MHz is necessary.
4.2 Classical Communication Requirements
Any QKD system requires a reliable classical channel to execute all post-processing steps.
In a satellite-based scenario, classical communication bandwidth is a very important factor.
When designing our concept system, we aimed to minimize the uplink (ground to satellite)
bandwidth as it is expected to be quite limited for a small satellite. Downlink (satellite to
ground) bandwidth is expected to be reasonable.
To evaluate the communication requirements of our post-processing system (chapter 3)
at different possible key rates, experimental data is collected (using the apparatus described
in chapter 2) for 300 seconds at a receiver detection rate of about 150 kHz. A subset of the
data is then used to produce lower key rates in the range we expect to find for satellite-
based QKD. Specifically, each one second chunk of data is truncated accordingly to achieve
the desired raw key rate. The full QKD protocol is then performed on the resulting data
subsets and detailed uplink and downlink bandwidth statistics are collected and recorded.
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Parameter Value Unit
Time-tag precision 78 picosec
Time register width 34 bit
Channel register width 3 bit
Total bits per time-tag 37 bit
Total with byte alignment 40 bit
Duration of measurement 300 sec
Maximum average received time-tag rate 100 kHz
Time to stream 100k time-tags (2 Mbit/s link) 2 sec
Time to stream 100k time-tags (5 Mbit/s link) 0.8 sec
Time to stream 5 min worth of time-tags (2 Mbit/s link) 600 sec
Time to stream 5 min worth of time-tags (5 Mbit/s link) 240 sec
Table 4.7: Communication requirements for the transmission of raw time-tags from the
satellite to the ground.
4.2.1 Downlink
The largest portion of the downlink communication requirements come from the transmis-
sion of raw tags from the satellite to the ground station. Parameter estimates are provided
in table 4.7.
Table 4.8 summarizes downlink communication statistics collected from experimental
data at different raw key rates. Our estimates and results show that at least a 5 Mbit/s
downlink is required to be able to transmit and process all of the QKD data (collected
during the optical station flyover) in a single RF-station flyover.
4.2.2 Uplink
As mentioned, the satellite uplink bandwidth is expected to be limited, so our system
aims to minimize the upload rate. Table 4.9 displays uplink communication statistics
collected from experimental data at different raw key rates. Our results show that the
uplink requirement is indeed much lower than that for downlink. Our recommended uplink
bandwidth is 100 kbit/s, however the statistics for raw key rates above 50 kHz are provided
for scalability purposes only, as we do not expect the average observable rates to exceed
50 kHz over a single satellite pass.
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Raw key Time-tag data GPS data EC data Total Data rate
rate (Hz) (byte) (byte) (byte) (byte) (kbit/s)
10,000 14,850,000 16,632 65,512 14,932,144 402
20,000 29,700,000 16,632 132,176 29,848,808 804
30,000 44,550,000 16,632 254,764 44,821,396 1,207
40,000 59,400,000 16,632 322,566 59,739,198 1,609
50,000 74,250,000 16,632 389,568 74,656,200 2,011
60,000 89,100,000 16,632 519,086 89,635,718 2,414
70,000 103,950,000 16,632 452,386 104,419,018 2,813
80,000 118,800,000 16,632 519,086 119,335,718 3,214
90,000 133,650,000 16,632 596,898 134,263,530 3,617
100,000 148,500,000 16,632 654,722 149,171,354 4,018
Table 4.8: Downlink (satellite to ground) communication statistics resulting from process-
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Figure 4.1: Downlink classical communication data rates for different raw key rates.
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Raw key Coincidence EC data PA data Total Data rate
rate (Hz) data (byte) (byte) (byte) (byte) (kbit/s)
10,000 369,915 20,400 24,000 414,315 11
20,000 738,671 20,400 49,500 808,571 22
30,000 1,107,418 20,400 72,300 1,200,118 32
40,000 1,476,168 20,400 98,100 1,594,668 43
50,000 1,844,910 20,400 122,400 1,987,710 53
60,000 2,213,661 20,400 144,600 2,378,661 63
70,000 2,582,413 20,400 171,600 2,774,413 74
80,000 2,951,164 20,400 192,000 3,163,564 84
90,000 3,319,908 20,400 216,900 3,557,208 95
100,000 3,688,662 20,400 243,300 3,952,362 105
Table 4.9: Uplink (ground to satellite) communication statistics resulting from processing
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This chapter discusses the performance of each component of our high-loss QKD system
as well as our QKD results. Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 examine the performance of the
WCP source, the quantum receiver and the satellite-side software component respectively.
Section 5.4 presents our QKD rates obtained at various loss regimes.
5.1 WCP Source Performance
The performance of our WCP source was first characterized in [16, 54]. However, the
experimental apparatus has since evolved as discussed in chapter 2. In the previous version
of the experiment [16, 54], polarization measurements were performed one measurement
basis at a time due the lack of full quantum receiver, which has been added recently
(section 2.3). Moreover, here, the FPGA-controlled modulator (section 2.2.1) is modified
so that it produces a 128-state sequence of signal and decoy states with a different profile
than the 256-state sequence used in [16, 54]. To verify the quality of the source output,
we take measurements to ensure that the new sequence exhibits the desired signal/decoy
levels and state visibilities.
To measure the signal/decoy levels, we analyze the timing information of photon de-
tections coming from Alice’s fiber splitter (see figure 2.3). The resulting histogram is
displayed in figure 5.1. The histogram is produced by binning the time differences between
time-tags of detection events and the time-tag of the nearest reference pulse (which marks
the beginning of a new sequence) coming from the modulator. Signal and decoy states
are clearly identifiable as shorter (under 2 × 105 counts) or longer bars in the histogram,




















































































































Time since reference pulse [ns]
Figure 5.1: Timing histogram of photon detections coming from the fiber splitter at the
WCP source. Decoy states are clearly identifiable as shorter bars (under 2 × 105 counts)
in the histogram, while the taller bars correspond to signal states in the sequence. The
counts in time bin 127 correspond to a special reset state produced by the modulator to
delimit consecutive sequences.
and ν = 0.1). The measured locations of decoy states in the histogram agree with the
modulation sequence programmed into the modulator.
We use the quantum receiver (section 2.3) to measure the visibilities of the polarization
states produced by the source. When the 810 nm Ti:Sapph laser is in continuous wave
mode (i.e. not model-locked), the output photons at 532 nm have visibility of over 99% in
both bases. In the normal mode-locked state, the modulator is driven at the Ti:Sapph laser
frequency of 76 MHz. In this regime, visibility of >98% is maintained in the rectilinear
(H/V) measurement basis and >95% in the diagonal (D/A) basis.
Figure 5.2 displays the temporal variation of the QBER1 averaged over both bases. We
can see that the QBER is stable over long periods of several hours (it averages at 1.8±0.9%
in the last 160 minutes) and it only degrades due to changing room temperature/humidity
in the lab. A large temperature gradient affects the birefringence in the many optical fibers
which leads to the misalignment of the polarization reference frames of the source and the
receiver (see section 3.5).









Automated polarization alignment 
Figure 5.2: Stability measurement of the overall QKD system-wide QBER over a prolonged
period of time (6 hours) at 25 dB total channel loss. When the QBER rises significantly due
to changing lab temperature/humidity and laser spectrum drifts, we apply the automated
polarization procedure (section 3.5) to correct the alignment and reduce the QBER.
5.2 Quantum Receiver Performance
The performance of the quantum receiver is initially tested with polarized light produced
by placing a polarizer in front of the output beam of a strong laser at 532 nm and shining
this beam at the receiver through a neutral density (ND) filter to reduce the intensity. Our
tests show that the visibility is high (> 98%) in all four polarization states considered for
the BB84 protocol (H, V, D and A).
Due to the experimental nature of the optomechanical components utilized, some occa-
sional fine adjustments of the alignment of the optical path are required to maintain high
visibility. A professionally machined rigid framework would not suffer from this problem.
Nevertheless, the receiver’s alignment has been observed to be stable over several days.
Furthermore, the quantum receiver is tested as part of the overall high-loss QKD system
using the WCP source described in section 2.2, the QKD software detailed in chapter 3
and the polarization alignment software2. As illustrated in figure 5.2, our automated
polarization alignment procedure works very well to improve the QBER in the case of
alignment drifts between the polarization reference frames of the source and the receiver.
2As discussed in section 3.5, the quantum receiver contains the wave plate triplet which is used for our
automated polarization alignment procedure.
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Raw key Sifted key QBER Processing OS overhead Memory usage
rate (Hz) rate (Hz) (%) time (sec) (sec) (Mbyte)
10,000 3,538 4.4 46.7 14.4 25.98
20,000 7,186 4.8 65.4 16.2 43.06
30,000 10,586 4.6 86.7 18.3 59.11
40,000 13,833 4.9 115.9 18.4 75.63
50,000 17,512 5.0 157.1 21.5 93.74
60,000 21,145 4.9 206.1 21.8 110.30
70,000 24,552 4.8 257.7 23.5 125.38
80,000 28,276 4.7 323.5 24.6 141.92
90,000 32,489 4.8 408.3 26.6 158.44
100,000 35,527 5.1 481.9 29.2 175.04
Table 5.1: Computation statistics resulting from processing 300 seconds of QKD data. The
processing time, OS overhead and memory usage of the satellite-side QKD process have
been measured with the Linux time command. The operating system (OS) overhead is the
time taken up by OS-level facilities invoked by the QKD process.
5.3 Satellite-Side Software Performance
The satellite-side software component is tested on an inexpensive ($150), low-power (2 W)
embedded system, namely the Freescale IMX53 QSB single-board computer. This board
features a single-core, 1 GHz ARM processor with 1 Gbyte of RAM and standard 100 Mbit
Ethernet connectivity [120]. The measured performance, displayed in figure 5.3, is in line
with our expectations and the computing resource requirements detailed in chapter 4. In
fact, the current bottleneck is not at Bob’s side but rather at the computer on Alice’s side
and at the network communication link between Alice and Bob. In a future implemen-
tation, the computer/server at Alice can be made significantly more powerful than our
current desktop PC.
As discussed in section 4.2, we use the weak coherent source and quantum receiver
to collect experimental QKD data for 300 seconds at a receiver detection rate of about
150 kHz. Each one second chunk of this data is then truncated to produce lower key rates
in the range we expect for satellite-based QKD [18]. The full QKD protocol is performed
on the resulting data subsets at predefined raw-key rates to obtain computation statistics
for a range of rates. The focus in this section is on software performance and not on QKD
rates, which are the topic of section 5.4.
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Raw key length, n [Mbit]
Figure 5.3: Performance of the satellite-side QKD process running on a Freescale IMX53
embedded ARM board. The processing time scales quadratically with the raw-key rate.
The R2 value of 0.9996 indicates a very strong correlation, that is, a very good fit of the
trend line. This data used for software performance evaluation only. In reality, we do not
expect the raw key length to exceed 10 megabits over a single satellite pass.
Table 5.1 shows detailed memory and CPU usage for the satellite-side QKD process.
The runtime is graphically depicted in figure 5.3. As seen in section 4.1.2, privacy am-
plification is asymptotically quadratic in the block size/raw-key length. All the other
post-processing steps behave linearly. Hence, it is expected that the performance of the
overall QKD process scales quadratically with the raw-key length as observed in figure 5.3.
Note that figure 5.3 explores very large raw key length values (over 25 Mbit) for scalability
purposes. In reality, we do not expect the raw key length to exceed 10 megabits over a
single satellite pass [18].
77
5.4 QKD Results
We test the performance of the entire high-loss QKD system (detailed in chapter 2) com-
prising the WCP source (section 2.2), the quantum receiver (section 2.3) and the QKD post-
processing system (chapter 3) including the polarization alignment software (section 3.5).
We measure the QKD rates for various fixed losses above 28 dB, and with channel loss
continuously varied to emulate a satellite pass.
Note that the previous version of the experiment [16] provides similar results, but [16]
only infers the performance of the QKD protocol in these high-loss conditions by employ-
ing a different coincidence analysis and without implementing the error-correction and
privacy amplification steps of the protocol. In this experiment, our aim is to use the newly
constructed quantum receiver to demonstrate full QKD in action. Similarly to [16], our
primary focus is on high-loss regimes which are expected for QKD with a satellite uplink
as shown in link analysis and simulations [18].
5.4.1 QKD at Fixed Loss Levels
Table 5.2 summarizes our QKD results for fixed total channel loss between 28.9 dB and
56.1 dB. The secure key rates, plotted in figure 5.4, vary between 2 kbit/s at 28.9 dB and
1 bit/s at 56.1 dB. The coincidence window for each measurement is chosen according to
the optimal curve given in figure 5 in [16].
The QBER values tend to increase with channel loss due to lower signal-to-noise (SNR)
ratio. However, the QBER decreases as the size of the coincidence window gets smaller,
because of better temporal filtering—smaller coincidence window means less background
photon detection events are accidentally included in the sifted key.
Secure key lengths are calculated through the weak+vacuum decoy-state asymptotic
key rate formalism [14] discussed in section 1.2.2, including the error correction efficiency,
ηEC ∈ [1.3, 1.7], achieved by the LDPC algorithm (see section 3.6.2). Note that [16] assumes
the use of the Cascade error correction protocol (see section 3.6.1) with a fixed ηEC = 1.22,
and hence, the secure key rates reported there are slightly higher.
5.4.2 Emulating a Satellite Pass
To emulate a satellite pass, the loss in the quantum channel is slowly and continuously
varied with the movable lens (figure 2.4) from 60 dB to 25 dB and back. Then, a curve
fit of the per-second loss data is produced and points from that curve are systematically
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Loss QBER Coincidence Sifted key rate Secure key rate Secure key rate
(dB) (%) window (ns) (bit/s) (bit/s) (bit/laser pulse)
28.9 2.9 1.60 16,659 2,015 6.24× 10−5
34.8 2.6 1.50 3,064 538 1.78× 10−5
40.1 2.2 1.40 1,145 159 6.58× 10−6
45.4 2.7 1.25 393 56 1.70× 10−6
50.1 4.3 1.20 119 17 5.17× 10−7
52.0 3.9 0.70 49 8 2.60× 10−7
54.0 2.8 0.40 18 7 1.92× 10−7
56.1 2.1 0.30 8 1 2.71× 10−8
Table 5.2: Sifted and secure key rates and associated statistics for a range of fixed loss
levels. The raw key rate (not shown) is about double the sifted key rate. The coincidence
window is chosen according to the optimal curve given in figure 5 in [16]. Note that the
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Figure 5.4: Average sifted and secure key rates versus total channel loss in high-loss regimes.
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Figure 5.5: Loss curves for an upper quartile [18] satellite pass (blue) and our experimental
data (green).
selected to closely match the expected loss curve (blue in figure 5.5) of an upper-quartile
satellite pass [18]. The resulting loss curve is displayed in green in figure 5.5.
Each selected point corresponds to a one-second chunk of QKD data collected during
the long measurement with variable loss. Those one-second chunks are then put together
to produce the green loss curve in figure 5.5. Effectively, we piece together multiple chunks
of QKD data (taken at various loss levels) to produce a continuous data set which closely
resembles QKD data from a satellite uplink.
With our 76 MHz WCP source, assuming poor atmospheric conditions, and including
finite-size effects without statistical fluctuations [14] (see section 1.2.2), we obtain 16.08 kbit




The latest advances in computing and communications technology have come with a grow-
ing demand for security and privacy. Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises to deliver
unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics; however, its point-
to-point range is currently limited to terrestrial links of up to 260 km.
The research presented in this thesis contributes towards a potential global-scale de-
ployment of QKD over free-space links to an orbiting satellite. As part of ongoing feasibility
studies of the Canadian Quantum Encryption and Science Satellite (QEYSSat) mission,
this work focuses on the necessary data processing algorithms and their computing resource
requirements on the spacecraft. It also details the design, implementation and performance
analysis of a complete QKD testbed system employing a decoy-state BB84 scheme under
high loss to demonstrate the feasibility of QKD with a satellite uplink. Our experiment
helps to establish good estimates of the overall complexity, the computing resources nec-
essary, and the bandwidth requirements of the RF links. Thus, it provides a foundation
for the future development of the quantum payload onboard QEYSSat.
The QKD post-processing subsystem described in this thesis aims to minimize the
computing requirements at one side of the link, unlike most traditional implementations
which assume symmetric computing resources at each end. It features precise coincidence
analysis, error correction based on low-density parity-check codes, privacy amplification
employing Toeplitz hash functions, and a procedure for automated polarization alignment.
Our main result is that the necessary processing power and memory requirements are
well within the capabilities of modern low-power computing technology. We estimate that
a CPU with at least 750 MHz clock is needed on the satellite and at least 256 Mbyte of
memory. We conclude that, in the worst case, an RF link with 5 Mbit of downlink and
100 kbit of uplink bandwidth is required. As a proof of concept, we ran the satellite-side
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QKD software on an ARM board (consuming 2 W of power) and measured its perfor-
mance while executing a full QKD protocol. Our performance results are promising and
our implementation is platform-independent, so it can be ported to any space-qualified
computing system.
Furthermore, the entire QKD system was tested at a range of fixed high losses and was
able to generate a secure key at up to 56.1 dB of loss in the quantum channel. We also
performed tests under varying-loss conditions similar to those in a real satellite uplink. We
obtained 16.08 kbit of secure key for an upper-quartile pass, with a communication time
of less than 5 minutes, a realistic duration of a satellite key exchange.
In the future, a number of areas in our current satellite-based QKD testbed system
could be improved:
• WCP Source: Our Ti:Sapph laser has a repetition rate of 76 MHz, however, Ti:Sapph
lasers operating at several GHz have recently become available [121]. Since the
modulation subsystem is capable of running at those frequencies, the WCP source
can in principle be upgraded with a simple replacement of the current Ti:Sapph laser.
• Modulator : The current pseudo-random sequence should be replaced with a truly
random one which never repeats.
• Receiver : The compensation components of the automated polarization alignment
system should be moved from the receiver to the source. The overall stability of the
receiver should be improved, and the receiver should be tested outdoors preferably
on a moving platform.
• Data Processing Software: Hardware-specific acceleration techniques such as SIMD
extensions could improve the performance results by a factor of three to four. The
coincidence algorithm should be adapted to work with a moving receiver. GPU
acceleration could be used for LDPC decoding on the ground. The optimized version
of the privacy-amplification algorithm with FFTs should be implemented.
• Data Processing Hardware: A fully integrated prototype of the payload data pro-
cessing system should be developed. The computer could be based on an existing
space-qualified SOC such as the REACT card by Neptec Technologies [122] featuring
a 1.2 GHz PowerPC MPC8548, 512 MB of DDR2 RAM with built-in error correction,
as well as an on-board FPGA that can be used to port DotFast’s existing time-tagging
solution.
These improvements will further demonstrate the technological readiness of satellite-
based QKD and bring the QEYSSat proposal closer to a concrete mission in space.
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A Survey of Computing Hardware Used in
Space Applications
Computing hardware has been a key part of spaceflight missions since the early days
of space discovery. In fact, the computer industry owes at least part of its early de-
velopment to the NASA space exploration programs and their challenging data process-
ing requirements [123, 124]. While the first NASA missions relied on low-level, custom
logic to perform only the most essential tasks, many modern spacecraft incorporate high-
performance, general-purpose computing hardware. Those computers are used for various
functions: navigation, attitude control, sensor/scientific instruments data processing, gen-
eral system control, communication protocols, just to name a few. This transition towards
high-performance processing, in-flight software updates and remote-controlled instruments
has allowed space missions to become more complex. It has also made them much more
flexible, as software changes are a lot cheaper and faster to implement than costly hardware
modifications [123].
Another driver for improvement of space computing hardware has been the need for
autonomous operations. The risk to human life in manned missions and the remote lo-
cations of places of interest (e.g. the round-trip communication delay between Earth and
Mars is about 40 minutes) has pushed NASA to focus on unmanned, robotic space ex-
plorations. However, autonomous systems such as the recent Mars rovers require a lot of
onboard processing power to be able to make complex decisions with stringent real-time
constraints, without the possibility of immediate feedback and assistance from mission
control on Earth [125, 126].
On the other hand, there are some significant difficulties which hold back the penetra-
tion of new technologies into the space exploration domain. Modern computer components
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Year Mission CPU RAM Operating System
1969 Apollo 11 1 MHz Custom, 16-bit 36 KB Custom
1981 Space Shuttle 4.77 MHz Intel 8086 1 MB Custom
1997 Sejourner 0.1 MHz Intel 80C85 512 KB Custom cyclic executive
2004 Spirit/Opportunity 20 MHz IBM RAD6000 128 MB VxWorks
2006 CALIPSO 160 MHz 603r PowerPC 128 MB VxWorks
2011 Curiosity 200 MHz IBM RAD750 256 MB VxWorks
Table A.1: Main computer components in several past NASA missions [123, 124, 126, 127].
as they are cannot be deployed in space because they are not build to withstand all the
damaging effects of the harsh environmental conditions (see section A.1). Additional en-
gineering and qualification is required to make those systems more durable and reliable.
This process is unfortunately both costly and time-consuming. Manufacturers also have
little economical incentive to move forward, as the market for space-grade computers is
rather small. Hence, commercial computing solutions on the ground continue to be several
technological generations ahead of the ones used in space.
This chapter provides a survey of computing solutions used in space. It is not meant
as an extensive study (due to its limited scope), so it mostly refers to NASA-associated
projects and missions and omits references to other countries’ space programs (published
information about those is not very abundant). Section A.2 presents a brief history of
computing hardware used by NASA in the past. In section A.3, the transition from custom-
built hardware towards partially hardened commercial off-the-shelf components is reviewed
as well as the associated fault-tolerant design techniques. Finally, section A.4 gives an
overview of what is state-of-the-art in space-grade computer technologies.
A.1 Main Challenges
Space-grade computers face many challenges in the harsh, limited-resource environments
which they need to endure. During takeoff, and optionally landing, systems are subject to
severe vibrational strain. Once in outer space, temperatures can vary from 4 K to 400 K.
Hence, components have to be engineered and built to much higher reliability standards.
Usually, this involves using more durable materials and an extensive qualification effort.
Spacecraft also experience various radiation effects. On Earth, the planet’s magnetic
field and atmosphere provide a natural cosmic radiation shield. In space, high-energy par-
ticles can damage sensitive digital electronics (e.g. memory chips), which can render a
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spacecraft unusable. The most common are bit-flip errors caused by single-event upsets
(SEUs) [128]. Other single event effects such as single-event latchup (SEL), single-event
burnout (SEB) and single-event gate rupture (SEGR) are more rare but also more dam-
aging. Unfortunately, modern RAM chips are semiconductor-based, volatile and not very
reliable, so for very high radiation environments (e.g. closer to the Sun) older ferrite-
core memories are often used. Radiation hardening is the technique used to design and
manufacture radiation-resistant hardware components. It consists of shielding sensitive
components from electro-magnetic radiation and other forms of interference [128].
Furthermore, space-grade systems need to respect stringent weight, size and power
constraints. In fact, a recent study for the Mars Pathfinder mission has shown that reducing
the total spacecraft mass, volume and power (by employing newer microelectronics) can
not only reduce the overall mission cost but also allow for a more wide-ranging explorations
of Mars [129].
By their nature, spacecraft are usually placed in remote locations and not accessible
for maintenance and repair, so fault-tolerance, self-diagnostics and remote testability have
become critical for a mission’s success [123, 125]. The elements of fault-tolerant bus design
are examined in section A.3.
A.2 A Brief Historical Overview
For over 50 years, developments in analog and digital electronics have propelled achieve-
ments in space explorations. However, for the first 15 years of NASA missions, there are
no general purpose computers onboard [123, 130]. In those early stages of space discov-
ery, during the 1960s and 1970s, the main challenge is to design and manufacture basic
electronic circuits which could withstand the vibrations of a rocket launch and the hostile
conditions in space (as discussed in section A.1). In that time, several research initiatives
are created in US government labs to established the requirements and space qualification
framework for spacecraft computers. The most notable project is the Self Test And Repair
Computer (STAR) project, created at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), California
Institute of Technology [130]. Interestingly, the concept of fault-tolerance first emerges out
of STAR research on reliability of computer systems.
During the 1980s, the trend of exponential growth in commercial computing hardware
becomes the norm—validating the so called Moore’s law, which predicts that transistor
counts on integrated circuits will double every two years. This development pushes NASA
to depend more and more on the commercial sector to supply highly reliable spacecraft
computers, rather than designing and building custom components and interfaces [123].
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One such collaboration with industry, and IBM Federal Systems in particular, gives rise to
the Generic Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (GVHSIC) project. The outcome of the
initiative is the Common Flight Computer (CFC)—a four-chip, central-control computer
deployed on the famous Cassini mission to Saturn and its moon Titan [130].
The strong partnership with IBM leads to a generation of PowerPC-based spacecraft
computers in the 1990s and 2000s. IBM Federal Systems becomes Lockheed Martin Federal
Systems and several single-board computers are developed for the Mars rover missions:
Spirit, Opportunity and Curiosity [126, 130]. As seen in table A.1, those are all based
on the IBM RAD architecture—a PowerPC-based architecture designed with radiation
hardening in mind. For the first time, the exploration vehicles are using VxWorks—a
commercial real-time operating system (RTOS) developed by Wind River Systems [131].
Moreover, all additional software is written in the C programming language. This is a big
step forward from the custom cyclic executive operating systems and assembly-code level
programming employed on previous missions.
Most recently, NASA/JPL’s Center for Integrated Space Microsystems, has been work-
ing on a more generic flight control system, the X2000 System Flight Computer (SFC),
under the Outer Planets Program, originally intended for the Europa Orbiter Project
(meant to launch in 2003 but later delayed to 2008) [130, 132]. X2000 is unique in the
sense that its design is purposefully based around cutting-edge commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) components with the goal of improving performance and reducing overall devel-
opment and manufacturing costs [132, 133]. The X2000 SFC is described in more detail in
section A.3.3.
A.3 Transition Towards COTS Components
As mentioned in the previous section, building spacecraft computers with COTS com-
ponents is a logical, economically justified step. COTS solutions have many advantages:
state-of-the-art performance, much lower cost (both immediate and recurring), wide avail-
ability of commercial hardware and software components, as well as an established and
predictable upgrade path [127, 133].
On the other hand, the challenge with COTS is that such components are not designed
and built to high reliability standards. Recently, there have been significant efforts to-
wards developing fault-tolerant computing systems out of unreliable COTS parts mainly
by incorporating various forms of redundancy and self-testability into the designs. In the
next few sections, we look at two such COTS-based spacecraft computers, the CALIPSO
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Figure A.1: 4-way voting design (left) and recovery resynchronization logic (right) on the
CALIPSO satellite single-board computer [127].
single-board computer (SBC) (section A.3.2) and the JPL X2000 avionics system (section
A.3.3).
A.3.1 Common Data Bus Failure Modes
In [133], the authors from NASA/JPL identify the most common critical spacecraft data
bus failure modes resulting from radiation effects such as SEUs:
• Invalid Messages : Invalid data is found in messages sent over the data bus
• Non-Responsiveness : A response to a message returns late (i.e. fails to satisfy its
real-time constraint)
• Babbling : An uncontrolled data stream causes a communication delay or interruption
on the data bus
• Conflict of Node Address : Two or more nodes (e.g. processors, micro-controllers,
memory blocks, etc.) on the bus have the same address
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Figure A.2: JPL’s X2000 avionics system architecture (left) and multi-layer fault-tolerance
strategy (right) [133].
Those common failures are the ones to design against when applying fault-tolerant
techniques. According to Chau et al., it is now a standard procedure for NASA/JPL
engineers and scientists to perform the so called failure mode effect and criticality analysis
(FMECA) for each spacecraft computer design [133].
A.3.2 The CALIPSO Satellite SBC
A good example of a fault-tolerant COTS-based spacecraft computer is the Payload Con-
troller Processor flying onboard the Cloud-Aerosol Lidar and Infrared Pathfinder Satellite
Observations (CALIPSO) mission. As per table A.1 the CALIPSO SBC features the 603r
PowerPC processor (manufactured by Motorola on the 0.25 µm CMOS/EPI HyperMOS
2.0 process) running at 160 MHz core frequency and the VxWorks RTOS [127]. Redun-
dancy is central to the SBC design employing a 4-way voted processor system as depicted
in figure A.1.
The main idea behind the CALIPSO COTS-based SBC design is detecting and am-
plifying/correcting low level effects at the higher system level. As a result, performance
is often traded-off for improved reliability and higher radiation-tolerance [127]. The SBC
features the following radiation-effect mitigating design elements [127]:
• Memory Error Correction and Scrubbing : Volatile SD-RAM and non-volatile EEP-
ROM are protected with Single-bit Error Correction Double-bit Error Detection
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(SECDED). Non-volatile flash memory is redundant (mirrored components) and pro-
tected with Reed-Solomon error correcting codes.
• Hardened Critical Components : Designated critical system components such as the
processor voter ASIC as well as the memory and IO controllers (see figure A.1 left)
are radiation hardened.
• AC/DC Parameter / Frequency Derating : Several component parameters are derated
(or de-tuned) to lower levels. The maximum CPU frequency is reduced to 80% and
the SDRAM clock frequency and refresh rates are derated to reduce power, increase
reliability and minimize the risk of radiation-induced timing delays [127].
• Multiple Processor Voting : As depicted in figure A.1, four COTS (i.e. non-hardened)
PowerPC processors are used in a voting scheme to greatly reduce the effects of
single-event phenomena such as SEUs (see section A.1).
• Resynchronization: A combination of hardware and software logic (figure A.1 right)
performs processor resynchronization in the event of a voting disagreement. A dis-
agreeing processor is temporarily taken out of the voting scheme and recovered in
under 1 ms. In addition, all voting processors are periodically scrubbed (or resyn-
chronized) as a preliminary measure against buildups of SEUs. The refresh interval
is not fixed—it is selected based on satellite orbit parameters and predicted SEU
rates for a given orbit [127].
This successful design of the CALIPSO SBC based on the COTS 603r PowerPC has
been upgraded with the next generation 7447A (SOI) G4-PowerPC processor running at
1 GHz and it can be readily deployed in future satellite missions [127].
A.3.3 The X2000 Avionics System
Another successful COTS-based fault-tolerant spacecraft computer design comes from
NASA/JPL. JPL’s goal in designing the X2000 is to achieve a flexible and scalable ar-
chitecture, which can be reused in many future NASA missions and ultimately reduce the
long-term costs of space explorations [130]. According to its designers, Chau et al., the
X2000 is a “distributed, symmetric system of multiple computing nodes and device drivers
that share a common redundant bus architecture” [133].
The X2000 avionics system depicted in figure A.2 shares many of the fault-tolerant
architectural elements found on the CALIPSO SBC described in the previous section. The
X2000, manufactured by British Aerospace Federal Systems, features the newer generation
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Power PC 750 processor. Similar to the CALIPSO SBC, it employs industry standard
mechanical and electrical interfaces as well as COTS serial bus architectures. Specifically
Compact PCI (cPCI) is used for the local computer bus, while IEEE 1394 and I2C are the
system buses [130, 133].
IEEE 1394, a fast bus operating at 50-400 Mbit/s, is used for communicating space-
craft attitude, scientific data and other timing critical communication. I2C is a slower bus
operating at 100-400 kbit/s; it is used for communicating overall spacecraft health data
collected by onboard sensors [132]. As shown in figure A.2, the buses connect multiple com-
puting subsystems or nodes: flight computers, memory blocks, micro-controllers, optical
communication units, sensor banks and scientific instruments.
The fault-tolerant features of the X2000 avionics system can be summarized in the
following four layers [133]:
1. Native Fault Detection: The IEEE 1394 and I2C buses already have some built-in
fault detection. Invalid messages and non-responsiveness failure modes (see section
A.3.1) are detected using bus capabilities such as cyclic redundancy checks (CRC)
and acknowledgment.
2. Enhanced Fault Containment : The system’s fault containment capacity is increased
by an additional layer of hardware and software implemented on top of the native
bus capabilities. This layer is designed to detect conflicts of node addresses on the
two buses and babbling—failure modes which are more challenging. This layer also
contains a baseline recovery mechanism for low-level faults on each bus [133].
3. Mutually Assisted Fault Recovery : On their own, the IEEE 1394 and I2C buses
have some shortcomings, but on the X2000 they are designed to aid each other in
the isolation and recovery of difficult faults. For example, due to IEEE 1394’s tree
topology, a failed node or link can disrupt communication between the bus network
sub-trees, making it hard to isolate faults. However, the I2C bus can be used for
backup communication; likewise, the IEEE 1394 bus can be used to assist the I2C
bus [133].
4. Fault Control through System-Level Redundancy : Both buses are fully physically
redundant as illustrated in figure A.2 by parallel data lines. To save power, only one
set of the buses is active at a time. However, when one bus fails, the backup set
is powered up and used while the failed bus set is diagnosed and reset to a healthy
state, possibly by eliminating a faulty link or node in the process [132, 133].
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Figure A.3: Space Micro ProtonX-Box PowerPC SBC design and avionics suite cards [134].
The X2000 COTS-based architecture has been extensively evaluated. Quantitative
models show that reliability levels of a 32-node instance of the system are more than
0.9999 at the end of an 11-year mission, compared to a reliability of 0.86 for similar-size
non-fault tolerant systems [133].
A.4 Modern Commercial Payload Processing Hardware
OEM Specifications OS
Neptec 1.2 GHZ PPC, FPGA Linux
IBM/BAE RAD750 PowerPC VxWorks
SpaceMicro 8-core PowerPC, FPGA, DSP VxWorks
CPU Tech PowerPC 440 Linux
Table A.2: Modern space-grade single-board computer manufacturers [122, 126, 134, 135].
State-of-the-art commercial spacecraft computing systems employ many of the fault-
tolerant design elements discussed in the previous section. While certain critical compo-
103
nents are still radiation-hardened, many are COTS-based and feature cutting-edge hard-
ware and software as summarized in table A.2. Most commercial payload processing sys-
tems today are comprised of multiple blades or slices (figure A.3 right) hosted in a com-
pact chassis [128]. A great example is the REACT processor card by the Ottawa-based
company Neptec Technologies. Their PowerPC-based card features a 1.2 GHz PowerPC
MPC8548, 512 MB of DDR2 RAM with built-in error correction, as well as an on-board
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and an extensive list of connectivity features [122].
The most advanced space-qualified SBCs on the market today come from Space Mi-
cro [134]. Their Proton series SBCs offer high-end processing systems for a wide range of
avionics applications. As depicted in figure A.3, Space Micro Proton designs employ top
of the line PowerPC processors, and they also include FPGAs, digital signal processors
(DSPs) and modern interconnects such as PCI express, SpaceWire and RapidIO [134].
A.5 Conclusion
Throughout its history, NASA has relied extensively on analog and digital electronics for
all its space exploration programs. Even though payload processing systems have signif-
icantly evolved over the last 50 years, they still face the same challenges in the hostile
environment of outer space. At first, all components of a spacecraft computer had to be
fully radiation hardened and were a few technological generations behind. However, fault-
tolerant COTS-based designs such as the CALIPSO SBC and the X2000 avionics system
have shown that unhardened commercial computing hardware can be intelligently engi-
neered to work reliably in space. The move to COTS components has led to dramatically
improved spacecraft computing performance and an overall reduction of mission costs. To-
day, very high-performance COTS-based space-qualified SBCs can be readily purchased by
commercial suppliers such as Neptec and Space Micro.
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